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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
Petitioner, Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("EPCO"), submits this Brief 
in Petition for review of the court of appeals decision reached in Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construct, v. 51-SPR, L.L.C., 144P.3d261 (Utah App. 2006) (hereinafterEllsworth) which 
case is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the 
case pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 51, on December 14, 2006. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT, EVEN WHERE 
THE OTHER FOUR ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE ARE PRESENT, 
THE LOSS-SHARING ELEMENT OF A JOINT VENTURE IS A FACT 
QUESTION THAT CAN NOT BE DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
B. THE MARDANLOU STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE 
SETS FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND THE ELLSWORTH 
STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE IS FATALLY FLAWED. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT 
HELD THAT INTERNAL LOSS-ALLOCATING (NOT LOSS-SHARING) 
TERMS WITHIN THE AGREEMENT GAVE RISE TO A FACT 
QUESTION. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ABUSIVE 
LIEN STATUTE IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
LANGUAGE "MORE THAN IS DUE" APPEARING IN THE ABUSIVE 
STATUTE IS MET WHERE THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR 
THE CLAIM OF LIEN 
I 
Standard of Review 
All of the forgoing issues arise out of a partial summary judgment granted by Judge 
Anthony W. Schofield at the trial court level. As such, holdings on summary judgment are 
questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 
(Utah 2002). A statute is also involved both in the appeal and in the cross-appeal, and 
interpretations of statutes are reviewed for correctness. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 
935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 845 (Utah 1954); Cutler v. Bowen, 543 
P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); and Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
51-SPR- L.L.C. ("51-SPR") and Broadstone Investments, L.L.C. ("Broadstone") 
formed a joint venture to develop two commercial office buildings in American Fork, Utah. 
Broadstone, acting as an undisclosed partner of 51-SPR, hired Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company ("EPCO") as the general contractor for the project. The partnership 
began to unravel after 51 -SPR accused Broadstone of diverting partnership assets in the form 
of construction loan proceeds. Just as the building projects were completed by EPCO, 51-
SPR surfaced for the first time as the owner of the project when it kicked Broadstone out of 
the partnership and took complete control of the project. Broadstone's owner allegedly fled 
2 
to Hawaii, leaving Broadstone without assets, and default judgments were entered against 
it in favor of both EPCO and 51-SPR. Despite now receiving tens of thousands of dollars 
in rental income, and selling one of the buildings at an enormous profit, 51-SPR repudiated 
any obligation to pay over $800,000 of the construction costs for the project. EPCO and its 
subcontractors responded by filing liens on the project. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below: 
51-SPR filed suit to quiet title in the property. EPCO and the lien claimants were 
named in 51-SPR's suit, and EPCO and others filed separate suits. The actions were 
consolidated, and the litigation centered on the breach of contract and lien foreclosure claims. 
After extensive discovery, EPCO brought a motion for summary judgment on the joint 
venture liability/breach of contract claim. The summary judgment was predicated upon an 
extensive and detailed development/joint venture agreement between Broadstone and 51-
SPR, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " B." 51-SPR never suggested that the 
agreement was anything other than fully integrated, nor did it contend that it was ambiguous. 
Indeed, in opposing the summary judgment, 51-SPR tacitly conceded that the first four 
elements of a joint venture were manifestly present in the agreement, i.e., community of 
interest, common purpose, joint control, and a sharing ot profits. However, 51 -SPR argued 
that the agreement's silence on the subject of loss sharing rendered 51-SPR merely an 
investor, owing nothing to EPCO for construction costs. 
On December 31, 2002, Judge Anthony W. Schofield granted EPCO's summary 
3 
judgment motion. A copy of that Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." Judge Schofield 
noted that so pervasive was the control1 and outright domination of Broadstone by 51-SPR, 
that the court might have found that Broadstone was not a partner at all, but merely the agent 
of 51-SPR as an undisclosed principal. Summary Judgment Order, Exhibit "C," p. 12. As 
to the sharing of losses element, the trial court correctly noted that the sharing of losses is 
inferred by operation of law by reason of the fact that when 51-SPR put in $2.9 million of 
its own money to purchase the property, took joint tenancy in the property with all of its 
attendant liabilities, and guarantied the $4.3 million construction loan to construct the 
buildings,2 these actions comprised the very definition of partnership loss sharing, and the 
silence of the agreement on that subject has no bearing on the analysis. Summary Judgment 
Order, Exhibit "C." 
Despite having its liability determined on the contract claims, 51-SPR continued to 
litigate the lien claims both with EPCO and its subcontractors. Eventually, the 
subcontractors' motions for summary judgment on their lien claims were granted by Judge 
1
 For example, the agreement contained verbiage to the effect that Broadstone as a 
company was pledged to 51-SPR, and Broadstone's interest in the property was 
subordinated to 51-SPR's interest to secure the funds contributed by 51-SPR. The 
agreement rurther provided that Broadstone would provide monthly reports to 51-SPR, 
but that 51-SPR retained the right to be consulted as to all decisions affecting the 
property. The parties were to split profits 50%/50% . See, Exhibit "B." 
2
 It is little wonder that the agreement is silent as to the sharing of losses. With the 
$2.9 million contributed by 51-SPR for the land, and the $4.3 million on the construction 
loan guarantied by 51-SPR, the venture was flush with enough cash to pay all anticipated 
costs. There would literally be nothing but those construction loan funds themselves 
which could reasonably be at stake to be lost in the transaction. 
4 
Gary D. Stott, and the liens were foreclosed. A copy of Judge Stott's Findings and 
Conclusions is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." Shortly before trial, the subcontractor 
judgments were paid by 51-SPR, leaving only EPCO's lien claim. The amount of the lien 
claim was tried to the bench in a three-day trial, with EPCO putting on evidence of its 
damages.3 The trial court enforced the lien and contract actions to the amount of 
$721,215.93. It denied 51 -SPR' s abusive lien claim, denied that any portion of the liens had 
been waived, and granted EPCO attorney fees. However, the trial court refused to permit 
EPCO pre-judgment contractual interest4 on the grounds that the breach date was not clearly 
defined due to EPCO's failure to send to Broadstone (by now, having ceased to operate as 
a company) the final three construction draws, and the trial court refused to grant judgment 
to EPCO on a $78,000 change order which had been duly signed by Broadstone. Finding and 
Conclusions, Exhibit "D." 51-SPR appealed the trial court's finding that, as a matter of law, 
51-SPR and Broadstone had formed a joint venture. 51 -SPR also appealed the trial court's 
finding that the mechanics' liens were timely, that the lien waivers were ineffective, that the 
$78,000 included in the lien claim was not an abusive lien, and that EPCO was entitled to 
attorneys' fees. EPCO cross-appealed, requesting the appellate court to reverse the trial 
3
 The entitlement to a lien claim and the contract breach by 51-SPR (as a joint 
venturer with Broadstone)had already been decided in EPCO's favor by way of cross-
motions for summary judgment. However, the amount of the lien claim, the entitlement 
to attorney fees and interest, and 51-SPR's abusive lien counterclaim, were reserved for 
trial. With the contract claim already decided, most of the trial issues were academic, 
except as it related to quantum of recovery. 
4
 The contract permitted interest at 10% on unpaid balances. 
5 
court's finding that EPCO was not entitled to interest on its contract claim and requesting the 
$78,000 be awarded as a partnership debt. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding that a joint venture existed 
between 51-SPR and Broadstone, and remanded for findings of fact on that subject. App. 
Opinion f 18, Exhibit "A." It also reversed the trial court on the timeliness of the 
mechanic's lien, the effectiveness of the lien waiver, and the awarding of interest to EPCO. 
App. Opinion fflf 19-47, Exhibit "A." The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision 
with respect to the denial of the abusive lien and the failure of the $78,000 to qualify as a 
joint venture debt. Id. EPCO requested certiorari review issue of the joint venture liability 
issue only, believing that if the contract claim could be resolved by this court, payment could 
be made thereon, and the remaining issue of attorney fees and interest could be remanded to 
the trial court for resolution at some future date. A writ of certiorari was issued by this Court 
on December 14th, 2006. The Court also issued a writ of certiorari on a cross issue raised 
by 51-SPR, to the effect that the abusive lien portion of the Mechanic's Lien Act appearing 
at §38-1-25 is a strict liability statute. 
If this Court holds for EPCO on this appeal, we ask that the amounts awarded be paid 
from the bond on appeal. The remaining issues are much less complicated and can be 
quickly resolved at the trial level if the contract claim is put to rest once and for all. 
Facts Established in the Record Below: 
On June 15, 2000, Guy Hatch, acting on behalf of his company Broadstone, entered 
6 
into an agreement with one Robert Chimento, acting through his company 51-SPR. The 
parties referred to the agreement as Addendum No. 2. Development Agreement, Exhibit 
"B"; App. Opinion | 2, Exhibit "A." The development agreement, identified a 6.58 acre 
parcel in American Fork which the parties agreed they would jointly develop into two 
commercial office buildings known as Northshore I and II. Development Agreement, Exhibit 
"B." 51-SPR agreed to contribute cash and Broadstone agreed to contribute construction 
expertise and services for the development of the office complex in a profit sharing venture. 
Development Agreement, Exhibit "B." 
Mr. Chimento personally negotiated the acquisition of the property. Summary 
Judgment Order, p. 4, Exhibit "C." After acquiring the property, Broadstone entered into two 
identical construction AIA form fixed-price construction agreements with EPCO for building 
the structures of the buildings. Throughout the project and up until the project was nearly 
completed, EPCO was unaware of 5l-SPR's participation in the development with 
Broadstone and had all of its dealings exclusively with Hatch. Findings and Conclusions, p. 
8,118 Exhibit "D"; App. Opinion 1j 3, Exhibit "A." Central Bank provided the short-term 
construction funding and inspected EPCO' s work throughout the construction of the proj ects. 
Findings and Conclusions, p. 3, Exhibit "D." During the course of construction, the 
subcontractors submitted construction draws to EPCO, who in turn would submit draw 
requests to Hatch. Id. Particularly toward the end of the project, Hatch became suspiciously 
slow in submitting the EPCO draws to the bank. Tr. 302 to 303; App. Opinion, ^ 6, Exhibit 
7 
"A." This was because the bank loan had nearly run out,5 yet all of the contract balances had 
not been paid to EPCO for work on the project. Tr. 317-321; App. Opinion T| 5, Exhibit "A." 
After the draw requests were received by Central Bank, the bank issued joint checks to 
EPCO and its subcontractors, which contained lien waivers on the backs of the checks. Lien 
Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. Opinion f 6, Exhibit "A." The trial court held that the lien waivers 
on the backs of the checks applied, but only as of the draw date the subcontractors submitted 
their respective draw requests, and not as of the day the check was issued, received, or 
cashed. Lien Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. Opinion f^ 6, Exhibit "A." The significance of this 
is that, at the time of trial, the evidence showed that none of the contract balances were 
waived by the lien releases appearing on checks issued by Central Bank on construction 
payment requests made, in some instances, months earlier Tr. 309-311. The trial court 
implicitly found that there was no portion of the lien claim that was waived by the interim 
checks issued to the parties, because the waivers appliedpro tanto only to draw dates tied to 
when the subcontractor submitted their pay requests.6 As the construction loan dwindled,7 
5
 51-SPR claimed that Hatch diverted part of the construction funding. However, 
EPCO has never seen any evidence supporting this conclusion. 
6
 Regretfully, the >ourt did not make this an express provision of its Findings and 
Conclusions, although it appears implicit in the court's holding since the lien amount 
permitted was the exact equivalent of the contract balances owed. Findings and 
Conclusions, p. 16, Exhibit "D." The court of appeals took umbrage with the absence of 
an express finding on this point, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for 
clarification. App. Opinion If 37, Exhibit "A." 
7
 Broadstone failed to pay three draws consisting of $217,145 on Building I and 
$502,730 on Building II, before subcontractor amounts are backed out. Findings and 
8 
Broadstone failed to pay EPCO for several months. Tr. 293-98; App. Opinion f 5, Exhibit 
"A." Despite the non-payment, EPCO raced through and completed the project. Toward the 
end of the project Guy Hatch disappeared leaving change order requests un-processed and 
nowhere for EPCO to send payment draw requests. Tr. 294; App. Opinion f 5, 7, Exhibit 
"A." Because the invoices which had been sent to Broadstone were being ignored, and 
because there was no one to process draws or change orders, EPCO did not send the last 
three draws to Broadstone. TR. 294; App. Opinion f 5, Exhibit "A." The architect testified 
at trial that all of the work within the scope of EPCO's contracts, and numerous change 
orders, were satisfactorily completed. Findings and Conclusions, p. 16, Exhibit "D." 51 -SPR 
did not suggest, nor was there any evidence at trial, that there was any work uncompleted by 
EPCO or that any had been done in a defective manner. Findings and Conclusions, p. 7, 
Exhibit "D." To the contrary, the testimony was that all work was satisfactorily completed. 
Id. 
After learning of 51-SPR, EPCO called Mr. Chimento asking for payment. Mr. 
Chimento wrote to EPCO apologizing for the late payments and blaming it on the fact that 
the long-term financing had not gone through. Summary Judgment Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C." 
Soon thereafter, 51 -SPR kicked Guy Hatch off of the project. Id. at p. 8. Despite the fact that 
it had exclusive control and ownership of two buildings built by EPCO, such that it was 
receiving $70,000 per month in rents (while only debt servicing $20,00 per month to the 
Conclusions, p. 7, f 12, Exhibit "D"; PL Ex. 27. 
9 
bank), 51 -SPR repudiated any obligation to pay EPCO or its subcontractors for construction 
costs. Id. at p. 7. EPCO and most of its subcontractors filed liens.8 51-SPR sued EPCO and 
the lien claimants and the actions were joined. As noted above, after extensive discovery, 
the trial court granted summary judgment on the joint venture liability, holding that 51-SPR 
was jointly and severally liable with Broadstone for all construction debts on the projects. 
Summary Judgment Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C." Despite the court having concluded that it 
was liable for all contract debts on the project, 51-SPR continued to contest the lien claims9 
for another year-and-a-half, until Judge Stott granted final judgement on all lien and contract 
claims. Findings and Conclusions, p. 7, Exhibit UD." 
VIII. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF EPCO'S APPEAL10 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT, EVEN WHERE 
THE OTHER FOUR ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE ARE PRESENT, 
THE LOSS-SHARING ELEMENT OF A JOINT VENTURE IS A FACT 
QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In the decision appealed from herein, the court of appeals stated in foot note 6: 
8
 EPCO's lien claim was in the amount of $850,651.07 and was inclusive of all the 
claims of the subcontractors. Including the judgment obtained by EPCO, the settlement 
and judgment amounts paid to all of the subcontractors, and attorney fees to date, 51-SPR 
has incurred amounts well in excess of twice that figure. 
9
 51-SPR substituted the liens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-28. The liens 
were substituted by a corporate surety bond, which is also serving as a supercedes bond in 
the appeal. 
10
 EPCO and 51-SPR stipulated that each party would provide one brief in which 
they addressed the issues of their appeal and in opposition to the other parties' appeal. 
The Supreme Court entered an Order approving the stipulation. Thus, Part VIII. 
addresses EPCO's appeal and Part IX. addresses the cross-appeal of 51-SPR. 
10 
It appears, then, that in most instances where there is no express agreement between 
the parties concerning the sharing of losses, the question of whether one has a duty 
to share losses will ordinarily be a question of fact. Ellsworth Paulsen Construction 
Company v. 51-SPR, LLC 
EPCO challenges this conclusion. The court of appeals cites no case to support the 
assertion, and we could find no Utah case that addresses the very narrow issue posed by this 
maxim. As a general rule, such a conclusion may make sense to the extent the other four 
elements11 of a joint venture are being litigated as questions of fact. But where there is an 
express agreement - as here, in which the other four elements are clearly present - and the 
agreement is silent as to the fifth loss-sharing element, EPCO believes that the better rule 
is that the loss-sharing element must be inferred by operation of law from the presence of the 
other four elements, and especially from the agreement to share in profits. 
The most expressive case in Utah on the sharing of losses element is Mud Control 
Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 845 (Utah 1954). In Mud Control, as in the case at bar, the 
parties had an extensive 17-page agreement which defined their mining partnership 
relationship.12 Under the agreement, one party contributed the drilling services and 
physically drilled for oil, while the other partner capitalized the enterprise by contributing 
11
 These are: a community of interest in the performance of a common purpose, a 
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter of the venture, a mutual right of control, a 
right to share in the profits, and a duty to share losses which need not be express, but may 
be inferred. Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). 
12
 51-SPR argued in its brief in opposition to certiorari that Mud Control can be 
distinguished in that it applies to mining partnerships. That appears to be a distinction 
without any meaning. 
11 
$ 16,000 for the drilling. A third-party vender sued both partners seeking payment for drilling 
supplies. The financing partner (who fits the profile of 51 -SPR in the case at bar) argued that 
it was not obligated to pay the bills of the other venturer, since the partnership agreement 
expressly limited the financial partners losses to the $16,000 contributed. The Supreme 
Court disagreed saying that as it related to third-party vendors: 
It is not unusual for such relationships to come into being, either by operation 
of law, or by express agreement, without the partners setting forth their 
obligations as to losses that may accrue. Responsibility for such losses is 
simply an incident of the partnership relation. It is elemental that when a 
partnership is created, an agreement limiting liability is not binding on third 
parties. Were it otherwise, partners could, by private agreement between 
themselves, obtain the advantages of a limited partnership without complying 
with the statutory requirements. Id. at 92-93. [Emphasis added]. 
In his opinion below, Judge Orme held that the owner of 51-SPR, Robert Chimento, 
created a fact issue by providing an affidavit in which he stated that he did not intend by 
entering into the agreement appearing in Exhibit "B" to share in any losses beyond his 
investment. Ellsworth, supra at f 16. The problem with this holding is that it directly 
conflicts with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Mud Control to the effect that where other 
elements of a partnership are present, a financial partner and labor partner cannot legally 
limit their liability to third-party venders by agreement amongst themselves. Thus, their 
private intentions do not come into the analysis. 
The other problem with the holding below in Ellsworth is that it permits the financial 
partner to pick and choose what debts it pays by simply defining such debts as "losses." For 
example, in the case at bar, in addition to the $2.9 million 51-SPR put into purchasing the 
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land, the company also guarantied a loan in the amount of $4.3 million dollars to pay for the 
start-up operations of the Northshore properties. It made this financial guaranty months after 
it entered into the partnership agreement appearing in Exhibit "B." Both before and after 
it kicked Broadstone out of the project, it presumably paid all of the utility bills, taxes on the 
property, maintenance fees, property management costs, title and property insurance, and all 
of the other bills to run the enterprise so that it could continue to obtain the rental profits. 
51-SPR also paid off all of the lien claimants except EPCO. Yet it takes the position it does 
not have to pay EPCO's construction costs because they are "losses" and Mr. Chimento did 
not intend to pay any more money than what he originally invested. No one has ever 
suggested that the venture itself has actually lost money. To the contrary, Mr. Chimento 
testified in his deposition that the properties made approximately $70,000 per month from 
rents, while debt servicing $20,000 per month to the bank for loans. Summary Judgement 
Order, p. 12, Exhibit "C." Since it has not paid for EPCO's construction costs, 51-SPR 
"cherry picked" the Broadstone obligations it will pay, all the while enjoying all of the 
benefits of ownership of two income producing assets by simply defining such costs as 
"losses." While the holding in Mud Control was not a summary judgment, it serves to 
buttress the conclusion that where the other elements of a partnership are present, the sharing 
of losses element occurs "by operation of law." 
The next case that bears resemblance to the facts of the case at bar is Cutler v. Bowen, 
543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975). In Cutler, as in Mud Control, the parties jointly operated a 
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tavern. One party contributed the physical assets of the tavern, and the other party provided 
labor as she ran the establishment over a period of years. During the joint operations, the 
parties met infrequently to split equally the net profits between themselves. When the 
property was condemned by a redevelopment agency, the parties' bickered over whether the 
redevelopment money should also be split equally. The Supreme Court noted: 
When parties join in an enterprise, it is usually in contemplation of success and 
making profits, and is often without much concern about who will bear losses. 
However, when they so engage in a venture for their mutual benefit or profit, 
that is generally held to be a partnership, in which the law imposes upon them 
both liability for debts or losses that may occur. Id. at 1351. [Emphasis added.] 
The Cutler and Mud Control cases bear resemblance to the case at bar in that as in the 
present case, you have 51-SPR primarily contributing capitol, and Broadstone, with whom 
EPCO had its contract, primarily contributing construction services and labor. The question 
arises under such facts as to whether the financial partner should be bound by the agreements 
of the partner providing the services. While not based on summary judgment, these cases 
appear to follow the general rule throughout the country that as to the sharing of losses 
element only (unlike to the other four elements), responsibility for losses are inferred as a 
matter of law from the presence of the other elements. Parks v. Riverside Ins. Co. of 
America, 308 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1962) ("An express agreement to share losses is not 
essential. Under Oklahoma law, as well as under general law, such an agreement is implied 
from an agreement to share profits."); Florida Tomato Packers v. Wilson, 296 So.2d 536 
(Fla. App. 1974) ("A duty to share losses actually and impliedly exists as a matter of 
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law"...where one party supplies labor and the other party supplies capital.); Windes v. 
RichmondHyparberic Medicine, Inc., 04-CV-854 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20,2005) (Unpublished 
opinion attached hereto as Exhibit "E" where the duty to share losses was inferred from an 
express agreement to share profits.); Stilwellv. Trutanich, 178 Cal. App. 2d 614, 621; 3 Cal 
Rptr. 285 (Cal. App. 1960) ("...[T]he law implies an obligation on the part of co-adventurers 
to bear losses in the same proportion as they agree to divide the profits."); Viking Realty, Inc. 
v. Balzebre, 535 So.2d 687 (Fla. App. 1988) (Summary judgment holding that where one 
party contributes labor and services and the other contributes capital, the sharing of losses 
element is automatically inferred.); Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson Interests, 741 So. 2d 867,871 
(La. App. 1999) (Where one provides labor and the other provides capital, the element is met 
by operation of law.). 
The forgoing cases keep faith with the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Cutler 
and Mud Control, finding that the sharing of losses element can be inferred as a matter of law 
in instances where there is an agreement to share profits, the existence of the other elements 
of a joint venture are present, and from the contribution of labor and services by one party 
and capital by the other party. 
In the Ellsworth decision below, the court of appeals blurred the distinction between 
parties' internally allocating risks and liabilities between themselves in anticipation of a joint 
venture, and what constitutes the sharing of losses in relation to the formation of a joint 
venture. For example, the court of appeals stated in the opinion below that after Mr. 
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Chimento put his initial capital at risk, the joint venture agreement contemplated Hatch and 
Broadstone repaying future construction financing and providing other cash needs to the 
project. Ellsworth at lj 16. This term, it was argued, gave rise to a factual issue as to the 
sharing of losses element. Id. However, internally allocating responsibilities among joint 
venturers is not the legal equivalent of an agreement to share losses for amounts owed to 
third parties. The court of appeals misconstrued what it means to share losses as it relates 
to third-party debtors, versus an internal agreement to allocate liability between partners. A 
careful reading of the cases demonstrates that the sharing of losses element is met when 
parties place assets into a venture, and those assets are at risk, regardless of how the 
participants treat matters internally. 
As stated by an Ohio court: 
We find no requirement that the members of a joint venture must pool 
expenses as well as income; that is the characteristic of a partnership. In joint 
ventures, pooling of expenses is not an absolute necessity. There is no reason 
why the parties cannot agree as to which part of the expenses each should 
bear before participating in profits... In addition, an agreement to share losses 
need not be express. In the absence of such a provision, an agreement will be 
implied to share losses to the same proportion as profits are shared. [Citations 
omitted, emphasis added.] Kahle v. Turner, 420 N.E. 2d 127; 66 Ohio App. 2d 
49, 52 (Ohio App. 1979). 
In his summary judgment ruling at the trial court level, Judge Schofield based his 
ruling on summary judgment more on the fact that Mr. Chimento had placed cash and real 
property assets into the venture (and, therefore, put them at risk of loss), while Broadstone 
and Mr. Hatch had placed their construction management services at risk of loss. As it 
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relates to third-party creditors of the venture, these acts trump any internal agreement 
requiring the parties to share expenses at any particular level. Sending this case back to the 
trial court based upon a fact issue relating to which partner would to contribute to which 
expenses misses the point entirely. 
B. THE MARDANLOU STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE 
SETS FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND THE ELLSWORTH 
STANDARD FOR FINDING A JOINT VENTURE IS FLAWED. 
There are two competing propositions in this appeal. The one put forth by EPCO and 
supported by the court of appeals decision in Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904 (Utah 
App. 2006)13 to the effect that the elements referred to in Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1974) are general evidence of the formation of a joint venture, but do not require absolute 
proof for each such element in order to establish a joint venture. The other proposition is the 
one asserted by 51 -SPR and upheld by a different panel of the court of appeals in Ellsworth, 
which requires strict proof as to each element in order to reach a finding of joint venture. 
As will be seen below, EPCO feels that it was the Mardanlou court that got it right, and the 
Ellsworth court went astray on requiring strict proof on each element. 
Even a casual survey of Utah decisions regarding joint venture formation will reveal 
that, in most instances, both at the trial level and on appeal, the courts reached a joint venture 
findings without discussing each of the elements present in Basset. In other words, the 
13
 Mardanlou in footnote 3 went so far as to make the somewhat startling assertion 
that even the sharing of profits element is not a requirement for a court to find a joint 
venture, but merely that its presence is one evidence of the existence of a partnership. 
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Basset elements were evidence that tended to support a finding of a joint venture, but not 
prerequisites thereto. The cases demonstrate that if the overall facts tend to show that the 
parties combined their property, money, skills, and assets to a common purpose, a court 
could reach a joint venture finding without strict proof as to each separate element. For the 
most part, these cases focus on the sharing of profits element and simply brush aside or 
ignore any reference to the sharing of losses. Cf Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904 
(Utah App. 2006); Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 889 (Utah 1983); Rogers v. 
M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029,1033 (Utah 1987); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 
1999); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezo, 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957). 
The better rule is that the Basset elements considered separately or in conjunction with 
each other are matters to be considered when making the joint venture determination, but 
none are independent conditions precedent to the creation of a partnership. 
That strict proof is required as to each element of a joint venture is also belied by the 
statutory definition of joint venture. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4 states that the sharing of 
profits is prima facie evidence of a joint venture. Prima facie evidence is that level of 
evidence necessary to entitle the party bearing the burden of proof to a judgment if not 
contravened by the other party. Bair v. Axiom Design, 20 P. 3d 388 (Utah 2001). It would 
appear that this statute specifies that proof of the sharing of profits between two partners is 
enough, without any other element, to establish the existence of the partnership sufficient to 
render a judgment thereon. Nothing is said about the quantum of proof as to the other 
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elements. Under this standard, summary judgment was appropriate because 51-SPR 
acknowledged the profit-sharing requirement. At the very least, this statute would seem to 
support the notion that the trial court was within its prerogative not to require strict proof as 
to each element, especially when the other four elements are present. If strict proof of loss-
sharing is not required, there is no reason to send the case back to the trial court. EPCO 
submits that sending this case back to the trial court on such a trivial point would risk 
another lengthy appeal that could extend the case for years. Applying a directed verdict 
standard as set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50, and given the presence of the 
other four elements of the joint venture, EPCO believes that a trial court could not reasonably 
find that 51 -SPR was a mere investor who could own the buildings without having to pay for 
them by reason its attempt to limit its losses in an internal agreement with a party that is 
otherwise manifestly its partner. 
The most commonsense statement of partnership law relative to the sharing of losses 
and its relationship with other four elements, and whether or not loss sharing is a matter of 
law, appears in Bromberg andRibstien on Partnership, Vol I, page 2:100: 
The important question with regard to loss sharing is whether partnership 
exists without an express agreement to share losses. This question is 
significant because purported partners, expecting profits, often do not provide 
for losses one way or the other. Some cases have denied partnership at least 
partly because the parties did not expressly agree to share losses. More often, 
the courts have held that loss sharing may be implied from other evidence of 
partnership. The Texas Revised Partnership Act Page 2:102 codifies this result 
by providing that "[a]n agreement to share losses by the owners of a business 
is not necessary to create a partnership." The two positions may be reconciled 
by recognizing that loss sharing takes on greater or lesser importance as an 
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xndependent element of partnership depending on the extent to which there is 
other evidence supporting partnership. [Citations omitted, emphasis added.] 
Since partners rarely contemplate losses \u incur dealings, much less in nen 
condition precedent to the finding of a partnership is ji ist bad law. ii i& iuieh .. -my iu uc 
present in the agreement, and when it is present, it should not be binding on _:md
 r\.:^ 
creditors of the venture, Such a rule would entitle the dominant partner, similar to 51-SPR 
control the ventui e to the poi tit of dii ecting the effoi ts of the other partner and takii ig a 
pledge of its assets, and yet still limit its liability for the debts of the partnership to third 
parties, Sending the case back to the trial rouf- to make a factual determination ni whe^v? 
who were not priv — i'viv:* -P 1 :* i :• i^hvrv w • ,1 ,i- i . * -n^T-i n*1^ 
partners' intentions as to loss sharing. This is particularly so in the case at bar where one of 
the partners has not been seen or heard from since being kicked from the partnership. EPCO 
and where one of the parties cannot be located. 
Better to make the rule as stated by Bi omberg and Ribstien that the sharing of losses 
may be evidence of a joint \ eutiire, depending on the presence or absence, the strength or 
weakness, of the other elem.en.ts. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT 
HELD THAT INTERNAL LOSS-ALLOCATING (NOT LOSS-SHARING) 
TERMS WITHIN THE AGREEMENT GAVE RISE TO A FACT 
QUESTION. 
The court of appeals' decision below on joint venture liability lacks cogency on 
several levels. The decision elevates form over substance, technical procedure over a justice 
and equity. The decision also lacks proportionality because it acknowledges the presence of 
four of the elements of a joint venture, but then strains at nat in allowing for the possibility 
that the joint venture was never formed by requiring EPCO to prove the parties' intentions 
as to the agreement. In doing so, it ignores a host of well-settled evidentiary rules. For 
example, Judge Schofield's decision granting summary judgment relied almost exclusively 
on the written joint venture agreement between the parties. It is well settled that the 
interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a matter of law. ELM, Inc. v. M.T. 
Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah App. 1998) (Where a contract is unambiguous, 
its interpretation is a matter of law.) This court will search the record in vain for any 
contention by any party that the joint venture agreement appearing herein as Exhibit "B" is 
anything other than an fully-integrated unambiguous agreement. Under such an agreement, 
Judge Schofield's duty was to read the agreement and apply the interpretative cannons. One 
of those cannons is that parol evidence as to Mr. Chimento's private intentions regarding the 
venture is not even admissible if the agreement is clear on its face, much less that it may form 
the basis of reversible error and earn a remand to the trial court. Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy 
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 ri,ii oup itii / i ," I1 \\\ '"•(lis, - ' (I uali -\|)|) t^i(i4> 11'A itlcnc c regarding mletii vlm-'li > mes 
oi contradicts an integrated agreement w ill not sen ;re to defeat si immai } ji ldgme i 
Using the elements in Basset, Judge Schofield found that the j oint venture agreement 
appearing in Exhibit "B" and the undisputed facts that supported the suuimat^ judgment 
be low de monsti atedsi ich a community of iiitei est in a common purpose between Broadstone 
and 51 SPR III tin; iln do|i,iiiiriii ml line Northsh* • • 
Broadstone was merely the agent or representative of 51-SPR, w ho was the princ pal. 
Summarv TnJ- •- - - Ordei H
 r,! 1<\ P 1?„ Exhibit "f1 " Tin- I^int propricl.trx mteiest 
. , . ; :- , . : . . . , -i jiui.,-! ^ * M K personally 
purcha ' J -hi • .. . ' • * *•• M-.sh, = an i that 
51-SPR owned the propert} in fee simple (not as a joint tenant with Broadstone) since the 
date of its purchase in December 1 x 2000. Id, at page n ITc further found thai r * -SPR had 
lie t oi:il> tl le i igl it to control the enterpi ise, but that it actually exercised such e^Mi;.- -
1 lie U / L I I i wi a p p e a l s Iwlmu u. * i ^ l i u i vn v mi lie <i-i plUXlUCU d pk lLs 
interpretation of the agreement which supported his version o\ the loss-sharing requirement. 
Since both interpretations weie plausible o^ the argument goes, fact issues preclude summary 
Judgment. The problem \\ ith this conclusion is that it Hies in the teeth -f the holding in Mud 
Control that said that partners could allocate expenses between each other, but could not limit 
their liability to third-party vendors. In addition, regardless of how plausible a single line in an 
agreement appears limiting ones liability with another partner it does not become ambiguous and 
subject to parol evidence regarding intent if taken as a w hole it results in a different conclusion 
Stated differently, when the agreement i« harmonized a- a \in»\ ^ith all of its sub-p.»ris. .! does 
not have the look, taste, smell, and feel of 51 -SPR as a mere investor. Rather all of 5 i -SPR V 
acts and statements lead to the inexorable conclusion that it was either a principal to Broadstone 
acting as agent, or full-on eon-- nartnor ^iih Hm;idsinn.- - ith aH of th^ nohts -nvi .ii^.^-
attendant thereto. 
point that it threw out Broadstone and seized complete control of Northshore and it profits. 
Id. at ft, nt. 9, p. 8. Judge Schofield further noted that the joint venture agreement specified 
the 50%/50% sharing of profits in at least three separate locations in the agreement, and that 
such sharing of profits was prima facie evidence of a joint venture. Id. at p. 9. Finally, and 
most critically, Judge Schofield held that when 51-SPR financed the purchase and 
construction costs for $2.9 million and then later guaranteed $4.3 million in bank debt, and 
further bore all of the risk attendant to property ownership, that these acts by themselves, and 
without anything more, constituted the very definition of "loss sharing ." Id. at p. 10. 
In making this ruling, Judge Schofield was not "inferring" the sharing of losses on 
summary judgment as characterized by the court of appeals. Ellsworth, at f 12. Judge 
Schofield made no such inference. There was also no weighing of evidence on the loss-
sharing requirement. Rather, in viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 51-SPR, the 
Judge noted that these acts—guarantying all bank debt, paying vendor invoices, holding 
property in its own name, and pledging assets to the bank—meet the common law 
requirements for 'loss sharing" as a matter of law, without regard to contrary testimony 
from Mr. Chimento as to his intent to not share losses. EPCO is only requesting this Court 
to reaffirm that the above acts are adequate to meet the loss-sharing requirements of Basset. 
The court of appeals held that the agreement itself, when read together with the 
Chimento Affidavit, create a fact issue as to whether 51-SPR's liability would be limited to 
its investment. Ellsworth, at ^ [16. However, it is not how the parties characterize their own 
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in< iiivcniciil lliiil I .igiiiiiL'.iiil, Inn ihiiltn in in. il m HI i uinliii ( iind IK IK MIS \ Inn I in 
conhnlling. Rogers i \t(* IhUur 'HS V M III1" l o P | Rn'anlless of nhul assets Mr. 
Chimento d/d not intend to place at risk, the court of appeals' decision ignores the assets that 
he actually did place at risk; namely, the $2.9 million, the $4.3 million, and the property 
regardless of what Mr. Chimento secretly intended to protect as separate proper ty 
The coin t of appeals' argunu vi also misconstrued the loss-sharing requirement when 
. .. ..:.;..a me .„;.;. ,a.. ... i .. agreemei \ c to Broadstone meeti ng me i uture cash needs of the 
ventun ^m .• > > i * ! - hi idge Schofield expressly stated tl mt: ;' • • 
i ne aii5v\ ei to me ,^ :ii*c on uiib appeal is IOI un:-. i ouri 10 define what i:> IHCJ 
by ihe shannu o\ losses " The court of appeals erroneously found that the losses at ^ - .K 
in a joint venture analysis aie die obligations to third panics if the venture goes south. 
However, a careful reading o\ Basse! and of Judge Schofield's order below make it clear 
that the losses element refers to assets brought into the partnership, w liieh ma\ be lu^i 
because the venture is noi profitable, and not the ahocat:on of [Partnership vender debts 
that is important. It is this loi mei definition w Inch courts across the Country have relied 
upon in stating that the sharing of losses is inferred when one partner contributes capital 
and the other partner contributes labor or services. See, infra at page 3. A definition 
implicit in Judge Orme's holding below that focuses on the parties' internal risks-
allocating terms is misplaced and has no bearing on a ^imiman. unUmient ai»..l\ MS 
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 EPCO did not know that 51-SPR was the linaiu lal hackei Ibi the project 1^: it 
knew that the land was to be used for construction, and ihat (here w as several nullum 
dollars available in the bank to fund the construction. As to the loss-sharing element, it 
was the undisputed fact o( > 1 -SPR placing these assets at risk, together with the 
admission of the presence ol the other elements, which prompted the summaiy judgment 
ruling that the latter companx was jointly and severally liable with Broadstone v thirl 
party creditors. Summary Judgment Order, Fxhibit "C." 
"A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a 
finding of a joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture 
determination, the duty to share losses is a factor unless there is an agreement 
to the contrary. Basset v. Baker. P. 2d.[sic]." Summary Judgment Order, 
Exhibit "C," ft. nt. 15, p. 11. [Emphasis are Judge Schofield's.] 
In other words, Judge Schofield was cognizant of the loss-allocating terms of the 
agreement (as contrasted to the loss-sharing requirement) between the parties, which the 
court of appeals held created a fact issue on the sharing of losses, but implied that such 
internal provisions were not determinative as to third-party creditors where the parties 
themselves defined how the losses would be allocated. 
Furthermore, the joint venture agreement expressly states that Broadstone's 
"...ownership and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure the LLC's and Hatch's 
obligation." Exhibit "B," p 2. It is hardly a meaningful gesture for the parties to allocate 
"loss-sharing" responsibility for third-party debts prior to entering the joint venture, when 
one parties' entire ownership as a whole is pledged to the other party for that purpose. 
In short, disputed facts do not preclude summary judgment where the facts are 
immaterial in light of the other decisive factors. Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649,655 (Utah App. 
1995). Burn v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994) ("According 
to the Utah Supreme Court, 'the mere existence of a genuine issue of fact...does not preclude 
the entry of summary judgment if those facts are immaterial to the resolution of the case.'"). 
For the court of appeals to declare that because the agreement is silent on the "sharing of 
losses" 51-SPRmay be absolved bearing EPCO's costs, is itself a circular argument, which 
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and other pertinent facts foinicd ilk, basis oi" the auniuicii \ • * 1-uiient beiovv and aiu nut 
disputed by 5 ! -SPR. cither below or now on appeal Bussa v. linker held that where the 
facts are not reasonably in dispute, summary judgment ^ a proper method U>M . u.im-. h. 
issue of v 'hethei : i nc t a jc int"' 'ent i n e is formed L I at 2 . ' . . ' . 
IX. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO 51-SPR'S CROSS-APPEAL 
Tlieie W.M. n\o vornponentN io >! ~SPR\ atuuinrni in its i. ross-petition for wi\ >)f 
cerooran u> im, , sect that the court ^ nppnl unapplied ilu \I-U.M C H c^~^t~ 
Abusive Lien Statute does not require a showing of malicious intent; and 2) The term "more 
than is due" in tl i,e .Abusive I ;ien Statute means vmi t . • w b u\ ,i lien for construction 
components that actually resmi >.«.i-. improvement to real property, and not for contractual 
d her ein the oi der in vv 1 lich till: ley appeal 
me laiig-i VJ x r ' ' • • . • ; 
• *-•-.* * vftuse of lien riglu -*enalt\. . .« \n\ person entitled to record or ti k 
alien under Section 18-1-3 is guilt} ol a class B misdemeanor who intentional, causes a 
claim of lid against any property v\ Inch contains i\ greater demand than the sum due to 
be recorded or filed: (a) with the intent to cloud the title: (b) to exact from the owner or 
person liable by m^ans of the excessive claim of hen more than is due; or (c) to procure 
any unjustified advantage or benefit. (2) In addition to any criminal penalties under 
Subsection (1), a person who \ iolates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property 
or an original conuaeioi < -i subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: fa) 
t\\ ice the amount bv w Inch \\\ ^ iun;jiui lien exceeds the amount actually due; ui (b) the 
actual damages incurred h\ ik ownu of the property. 
above. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ABUSIVE 
LIEN STATUTE IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE 
1. The Abusive Lien Statute Is Not A Strict Liability Statute. 
The issue before the court of appeals was whether or not the trial court properly found 
that EPCO did not file an abusive lien, because it did not have the requisite malicious intent 
to implicate the Abusive Lien Statute. In making this argument, 51-SPR does not attempt 
to marshal any evidence regarding the evidentiary basis for trial court's findings that the lien 
was not abusive and that there was no malicious or willful intent associated with filing the 
lien. Rather, 51-SPR argues that the Abusive Lien Statute does not require specific intent, 
but only requires the general intent to file a lien.18 
51-SPR is attempting to argue that the Abusive Lien Act is a strict liability statute 
which permits a litigant to claim the civil and criminal remedies referred to in that Act every 
time a person does not collect every cent of his or her lien. 51 -SPR buttresses this argument 
with dubious cannons of statutory interpretation and fuzzy grammar. Specifically, 51-SPR 
argues that because the introductory preamble to the statute defines the lien as "abusive" if 
18
 51-SPR's dissimulation should not be lost on the Court. In one half of their 
argument on joint venture liability they contend that they are an innocent investor who 
never intended to participate more than to get an honest return on their investment. In the 
second part related to the abusive lien, they assert that EPCO never had the right to give 
$78,000 to the project toward engineering fees then ask for it back as a part of its contract 
and lien claim, and that as the true owner of the improvements, 51-SPR is an innocent 
victim of an abusive lien. 
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the conlraelnr 'iiilrntionalh causes n rlinin of beif' In hr hied .IIHI Ihen Inter shies ' ^ illi 
intent to cloud title," that the sub-parts (b) and (c) to the statute that pertain to "extracting 
more than is due" and oi "pi< u ui ing an unjustified ;uh antagc" do not require a showing of 
intent. In other words. \ i .^c^ mat the Kuunw.m^ i;, the statute mak^v^ . i ^ 
civil penalties. 
51-SPR would have th'.seoun i cad out of (IK- \1msi\e I ien Statute any requirement 
:- !HIU animus, scienter o r ^ther mental culpahh- .i,.w K.ui into the statute the 
*« • . r u i . •• fail : ' •• 
were extracting more than L Jae and attempting f< MM ocure an unjustified ddvantagc. Vv lien 
the statute is harmonized as a whole, particularly unit the other parts of the lien statute, it is 
clear thoi mc legislature meant only to proscribe ma. icu>u ^ ,uui purposeful haelaa- in the use 
zl -SPR o interpretation w ould utterly eviscerate the lien statute and its legislative 
!
 i IK C-.ISL- at bar ih mstiuaive as to v\ hat u> urong uith 51-SPR's argument, 
EPCCTs judgment was for S\!L215.(H on a mechanic's lien el tin. ot S850.65I >7. 
Hou e\er. at the lime the hen ^ as tiled, none of HIVO's subcontractors had been paid, -o 
they filed aggiv^aic liens for an additional approximately $400,000.00 Since 5 " -SPR 
paid the subcontractor liens off on the door step of trial, with the benefit of hindsight, 
HPLU's lien was actually understated b\ sex era! hundred thousand dollars at the time it 
was filed, Thus, 51-SPR cannot even meet the threshold requirements of the Ahusiw 
Lien Statute of HPCO filing an overstated lien or that it was trying to obtain an unjustified 
advantage. Ye- unlet .51 -SPR s \ isum ui the statute, ^incc the lien uu:> more ih^n the 
judgment, it is by definition abusive 
purposes, because all would be a "crap shoot" as whether you would prevail. The lienor 
could be strictly liable under the statute because without the intent requirement, a failed lien 
would by definition be extracting more than is due and result in an unjustified advantage. 
Such an absurd result would "chill" the filing of liens back into the ice age. 
The proper reading of the Abusive Lien Statute is that the words "...intentionally 
causes a claim of lien to be filed against any property which contains a greater demand than 
the sum due to be recorded or filed," modifies all three of the subordinate passages, such that 
all three bad acts: 1) intending20 to cloud title; 2) exacting from the owner more than is due; 
and 3) procuring an unjustified advantage, requires a showing of intent However, it is clear 
from the statute that all three types of actions, clouding title,21 exacting excessive money, and 
procuring an unjustified advantage, are intent-, mens rea-type acts. The very nature of an 
allegation that a lien is "abusive" is fraught with the connotation of a culpable mental state 
requiring a wilful, flagrant, or reckless indifference to the property rights of another. 
20
 When seen in context, the word "intentionally" in the introductory sentence 
making it a crime to file and excessive lien should be read to mean "maliciously," and the 
word "intent" in the sub-part should be read to mean "purposefully." 
21
 It should be obvious that filing a mechanic's lien clouds the title of the property 
owner, and further that every act of clouding someone's title is not abusive, nor does it 
represent a criminal offense. By adding the words "with the intent" in front of the words 
"to cloud title," the legislature merely attempted to accentuate the notion that filing of the 
lien—even if accidently overstated—was not proscribed, but filing it solely with the 
objective of clouding the owner's title was abusive. In making this distinction, the 
legislature did not clearly manifest a legislative purpose to make the filing of a lien for an 
amount greater than what is ultimately found to be owed a strict liability act. 
29 
2. Subsection ( ( l ) (b) I M I U >ui Alaiiniai_; i . . ^ n k i n ^ c j l u i p ^ ; =.ijuiv -L 
Strict Liability, 
51-SPR takes umbrage with the court of appeals ' conclusion that even though sub-
parts ()Mb) ai ; HVc l of tin Mnisi'v I ion Statute are redundant and do not specify the 
r equs ik . nieni ^ ...;uit. u ^ ;<, . , ;-. • • aiinal s ta tu te ..^ .. i*;*..1. .a;pa*ae mental state 
102 (2003) is a default provision which states that every prohibited act requires a culpable 
mental state, and -V. a when Ihe criminal statute doas »•'*' specify a mental state for the 
prescribed v o i , ^ . , <. ^ w?p*7v rp<7 suiiu,, , . . .- *au/;a^ ...a, Miuwingly, or recklessly. 
M- ,^\ ^ tli» - * • --- • J.. '(|ffi>t'i7 us pi'^oj firn «"M\ 
///c*/v e.x/.s7.y a c/ear legislative purpose in making the statute a sti ict liability statute. Id. 
Against all odds, 51-SPR argues in its cross-petit inn for wril of certiorari (hat a-ang 
the word "" intentionally ' and " intent ' in (1) and subsection (l)(a) respectively, but not in 
latter-two actions. However, such an interpretation is contrary to a long line of cases which 
hold that: 
The purpose of ir-: m^cnanics lien aci is remedial in nature and seek;, to 
provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the 
value of the property of another by their materials or labor. First ofD*** <-'• 
Mortgage Investors v. Zundel and Assoc, OUU P.2J 521 (Utah 1979). 
2
 Under the court ul appeals"' interpretation, the ueiauit c u r a b l e mentas . I K • 
"intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Ellsworth at f^ 3 1 ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 
The clear legislative purpose of treating the Abusive Lien Statue as a mens rea statute 
as opposed to a strict liability statute is seen with Section 38-1-1823 which permits offers of 
judgment on lien amounts. If the judgment against the land owner is less than the amount 
offered by the landowner, the lien claimant is required to pay the attorney fees of the land 
owner. This statute also states that if the lien is found to be abusive under the Abusive Lien 
Statute § 3 8-1 -25, the lienor may not recover his attorney fees at all. This statute effectively 
shifts the burden of attorney fees to the lien filer if he overstates his lien, and causes him to 
forfeit his attorney fees if his lien is found to be abusive. These statutes manifest a legislative 
purpose in not making the Abusive Lien Statute a strict liability statute, since the offer of 
judgment statute (which was enacted at the same time as the Abusive Lien Statute) is 
designed to address the situation where a party innocently overstates his lien, but does not 
do so maliciously. In such a case, the result is he loses his attorney fees. In contrast, the 
Abusive Lien Statute permits severe criminal and civil penalties, but requires scienter and 
animus in order to invoke those penalties. The clear legislative purpose in not making an 
overstated lien a crime is also manifest by the Wrongful Lien Statute appearing at Utah Code 
Ann. £ 38-9-2(3). That statute states that the wrongful lien provisions do not apply to "a 
person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38 Chapter 
23
 In discerning the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court should look to 
harmonize it with other sections of the same statute. State v. Martinez, 52 P.3d 1276 1279 
(Utah 2002) (Finding a legislative intent in making a statute a strict liability statute, where 
such intent was expressed in related statutes.). 
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1 Mechanics" 1 ints "Id \l\ (Ins slululr. Ilu- Irgislaltiic is nuking il \ Icai llial w nnu-ful li m, 
like abusive liens, do iioi «• - •• to the average person makni!: • "ood. faith iilme u a 
mechanic's lien, even if iiuuh ciicntly overstated. 
B. 'i I il- ( OLRi • M AITi ALS DID NUi * K >l DING THAT THE 
•l.ANU'Atib"MORL: I MAN IS D l . i r \PP; - i \ IHh ABFSTVE 
STATUTE ISMFTWIH R* n , u ? i ; (v \ ( v ( si B %SI^ ! OR 
Tl II- CI. MM MI I | | - \ 
5 i-SPR argued in its brief in support of its cross-petition for writ of certiorari that the 
language of the Abusive Lien Statute and its sub-parts (bat a ben claimant cannot file ,t lion 
.hti . . ..^n .. ...ii'.Mi;i La: i, .1 i, , , , , liwii v<m;aiii- a * greater 
the lien claimant must have placed into the ground, regardless of whether or not there is a 
contractual basis for the lien In other words, 51~SPRbelio\ cs that even 'b> •. iiili FPCO
 L.o c 
its i noney to Bi oads tone to pay ic *. . \ c n g l nccn i i j^Lih, \ v,; i;; -> i; * a e p i oj L\J a; , ;u\ ,= .^ i 
a change order to the cont * * i • * • < 
*' The court ot appeals at footnote 12 analogized this claim by FPCO for a return 
of the $78,000 to a partner buying skis for himself from the owner and then issuing a 
change order lo the owner for the value of the skis Flu -our! then concludes that ih-
owner does not have a contract or lien right againsi the owner for the \ alue of the skis. 
despite the contract modification for their value. If the partner has actual, apparent and 
implied authority i which the court of appeals' "paiable" assumes). FPCO takes grave 
umbrage both w ith the conclusion reached on this issue, and the analog}' used, since r the 
ease at bar, the mone> was allegedly to be used to pay for engineering costs on the 
project. However, that is not the subject of this appeal. 
money for that project, EPCO's $800,000 lien was abusive when it contained a $78,000 
component for that amount. In essence, 51-SPR is saying that even when armed with a 
contract modification, EPCO could not claim a lien for an amount that did not actually go 
into the ground at the project. Frankly, EPCO is having trouble understanding how one 
claims "more than is due" when he has a contract specifying that exact amount. The statute 
would seem to lead to the opposite conclusion, since by definition, if you have a contractual 
basis for your claim, you are not claiming for more than is due under the contract. If the day 
comes that a lien claimant cannot make his lien claim co-terminus with his contract claim, 
100 years of lien law will be stood on its head. 
What 51-SPR is saying is that the lien must be abusive if it does not result in an 
integrated improvement to the property. However, this tired and threadbare argument has 
been answered on many occasions by this Court. For example, in John Wagner & Assoc, v. 
Hurcules, Lnc, 797 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Utah App. 1990), the court permitted recovery for 
modular buildings which were not anchored to the property. In Trench Shoring v. Saratoga 
Springs Development, LLC 57 P3d 241,246, (Utah App. 2006) the court permitted recovery 
25
 Richard Ellsworth testified that he did not know if Hatch used money for design 
work in the Northshore plaza, or indeed, if it was even paid to Hubble for design work at 
all. Tr. 65-66. The trial court stated that "Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon 
the instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien." Findings and 
Conclusions, If 16, p. 8., Exhibit "D." The simple facts are that no one knows where the 
money went that was given to Hatch, but that EPCO was armed with a change order on 
the Northshore project—from the only person with whom EPCO dealt on the 
project—when it filed the lien which included the change order amount. 
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replaced. The courts in these cases have indicated that it is not whether the "^npen, 15 
actually impro\ ed, but whether there was \ alue conferred by the contractor, T ~tah eases ha\ e 
permitted lien recovery for trucking serv ices to a site, temporary structure0 °it 1 ?;te. 
nialnials v\ hielifiH1 iJdi\ f in I I ml n< \ 1 1 iin orpin a In I into tlir JLJI ruiiid innluk <h 111111»111011 f IIM'II 
and removed from a site, and like structures and items that never find themselves into a 
project The lien -»taiuie itself states at § 38-1-3 that desmn 'A ork b \ engineers ami architects 
c a n l x n< ihihu ». u i . -I'nw improvements are evermadt-. . ...1. p n ^ K a i iaiul I iu testimony 
Engineering. ' I 'he court of appeals held that EPCO's belief that it was paying for 
engineering, coupled with a signed change order from the only person EPCO km -A to iv an 
owner roth* sUs, i l iLi m o g u ^ i iaiih ieqinrements oi the statute. andpro\ u k d a n . . idcnnarv 
I i ' ! ! . • - I I Sh,i: Ill t 
evidence for review, but simply selectively classifies the evidence that exists to suppor t its 
thesis. 
51 SI rR seems to contend that e^  en if a per son has a contract for construct KM- he 
to believe that a trial court is required, when confronted vvnh u iicn claim, to pai^e tin*- ••:.1' 
any • line items in a construction ^mli ... ;. make ^iin that al- l *hc line ii :111s \v -\\, 
construction contract actually go into the ground, . , . i a i a.> .* ..inn: p o n - n ^ <-: <hr 
contract as non-lienable. However, in making this argument, 51-SPR seems to forget that 
the best evidence of the "value of the services rendered, labor performed or materials or 
equipment furnished..." [§ 38-1-3] is the contract itself. See, Trench Shore Services v. 
Saratoga Springs Development, LLC 57 P3d 241,246 (Ut. App. 2006) (Case seems to hold 
for the proposition that the best evidence to support its reasonable lienable value is that 
amount appearing in the contract.). 51 -SPR argues in its brief in support of its cross-petition 
for writ of certiorari that liens cannot be claimed for contractual items or debts the contractor 
incurs but which are not incorporated into the property. Construction contractors advance 
money for permits, transportation of materials, surety bonds, design work, environmental 
studies, overhead, extended warranties, profit, testing, inspections, barricades, flag men and 
women, and scores of other items that may not actually result in an improvement to real 
property. Yet 51-SPR would have this Court go down a slippery slope and hold that even 
with a construction contract which designates such items for reimbursement from the owner, 
a lien claimant can only lien for those items that actually improve the real property. This is 
contrary to the remedial purposes of the lien statute, and the broad legislative purpose to 
protect suppliers and subcontractors. John Wagner & Assoc, v. Hurcules, Inc., 797 P.2d 
1123, 1132 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, even if one were to find that an individual component of a lien is not 
recoverable from under the lien statute, that is light-years away from saying that the lien was, 
therefore, abusive. The clear meaning and intent of the Abusive Lien Statute requires a 
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civil penalties of that Act. ' Hie trial court, which had the ability to observe 'the demeanor of 
witnesses in a highly factual "intent" setting, found that the lien was made in good fa ill ^ > 
reverse would require a finding of clear error, I he facts in this case simply do not lend 
themselves to i.n« li .i • om ly.it>ii 
7\s the trial court and court of appeals found, when a contractor is armed w ith a 
change order from the owner modifying the contract. \u- uch owner and particularly no 
subsequent owner—has grounds u» dami that the iicn --•• iu.. ^_.fining contract amount 
demand than the sum due." Unless the court retreats from an intent requirement and applies 
a strict liability standard, as long as there is a contractual basis for the lien, the lien is not 
abusive unuu -;u dilute. 
x. roNC- -«-iv 
Because the sharing of losses element is a mauc. of law, and the sharing of losses 
element refers to the assets each partner places at risk in the venture and not the debts to third 
pai ties, the court of appeals decisioi 1 to send the case back to the trial court h <» u., w.u 
de* nninah. - • • • I ! inall) be :ai lse strict proof of this elei i i = lit is i i : t 
required but oni^ represents evidence as to the existence of a joint venture, there is no just 
reason that this coiirt cannot affirm the trial court's summary judgment on the contract claim, 
i" • '• •• n:-;h . :. .uagincm against 51 SI J|IR foi $' / 21,215.93 plus interest at the parties' 
contractual rate of 10% from the date the judgment was entered.26 On 51-SPR's cross-
appeal, the legislative purpose behind the Abusive Lien Statute appearing at Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-25 makes it clear that it is not a strict liability statute, and a contractual basis for filing 
a lien is adequate to meet the good faith requirements of the Abusive Lien Statute. 
lis DATED thi  <f s day of January, 2007. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Maflrf^Poulsen 
^%ret W.Reich 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company 
26
 The court of appeals referred the case back to the trial court for a determination 
as to whether pre-judgment interest from the date of the default to the date of trial was 
allowed, based upon a fact question as to when the construction draws were submitted 
and whether there was an owner present to whom the draws could be submitted. 
However, the trial court's determination that post-judgment interest at the contractual 
interest rate of 10% would be part of the judgment has never been appealed from and 
should be part of the contract claim awarded if this Court reverses the holding of the court 
of appeals. 
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OPINION BY: ORME 
OPINION: ORME, Judge: 
[*P1] This case arises from a real estate 
project gone bad. We have before us the appeal 
and cross-appeal from several aspects of the 
trial court's rulings. We reverse in part and af-
firm in part, and remand for additional proceed-
ings. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Plaintiff Ellsworth Paulsen Con-
struction Company (Ellsworth) entered into two 
construction contracts with Guy Hatch and his 
company, Broadstone Investments, L.C. 
(Broadstone), under which Ellsworth agreed to 
act as general contractor for the construction of 
two commercial buildings (Building I and 
Building II) as part of a project in American 
Fork, Utah (the Northshore Property). 51-SPR, 
L.L.C. (SPR), through its owner, Robert Chi-
mento, entered into an agreement with Hatch 
and Broadstone (the Agreement), which pro-
vided, among [**2] other things, that SPR 
would contribute $ 2.9 million toward the pur-
chase and development of the Northshore 
Property and take title to the property as a ten-
ant in common with Broadstone. Based on the 
Agreement and SPR's actions, the trial court 
ruled on a partial summary judgment motion 
that SPR and Broadstone were joint venturers 
in the development of the Northshore Property 
and, thus, that SPR shared liability on the con-
struction contracts Broadstone had entered into 
with Ellsworth. 
[*P3] Apparently, however, Ellsworth 
knew nothing about SPR's involvement in the 
project, having no direct dealings with SPR un-
til Hatch disappeared toward the end of con-
struction and Ellsworth sought payment on out-
standing invoices that Hatch had left unpaid, nl 
Until that time, Ellsworth had dealt exclusively 
with Hatch as the owner of Broadstone, Broad-
stone being designated under the Agreement as 
the project manager in charge of supervising 
construction on the Northshore Property. 
nl According to SPR, Hatch left Utah 
for Hawaii, where he apparently remains 
to this day. 
[**3] 
[*P4] To fund the construction, Broad-
stone had entered into two separate construc-
tion loan arrangements with Central Bank, 
which Hatch and a co-member of Broadstone, 
Dan Parkinson, personally guarantied. Under 
the Agreement, Broadstone was "in charge of 
obtaining remaining needed construction fi-
nancing and institutional permanent financing." 
The Agreement also required that Broadstone 
was to "provide financing for needed construc-
tion monies for the office building[s] and re-
maining cash needs of the project" beyond 
SPR's $ 2.9 million investment. The Agreement 
also expressly provided that "Guy Hatch will 
guaranty such financing." 
[*P5] Prior to disappearing, and toward 
the end of construction on the Northshore 
Property, Hatch had become suspiciously slow 
in paying Ellsworth's invoices, apparently due 
to the fact that the construction loan funds w^e 
almost exhausted. At least according to SPR, 
Hatch had been drawing on the construction 
loan funds and using them in other projects un-
related to the Northshore Property. Despite not 
being paid, Ellsworth continued its work. To-
ward the end of the project, with the construc-
tion loan funds apparently exhausted and Hatch 
having [**4] disappeared, Ellsworth had no-
where to send its final three draw requests. 
[*P6] Throughout the earlier course of 
construction, Ellsworth would submit draw re-
quests to Central Bank either directly or 
through Hatch. Once the draws were approved, 
Central Bank would then issue checks to Ells-
worth for its work and for the work of its sub-
contractors. Each check bore a lien waiver pro-
vision on the reverse side of the instrument. n2 
The trial court ruled on summary judgment that 
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable, 
and therefore cut off any lien rights through the 
date of each draw request, which is the date the 
draw was requested and not the date the check 
was received or cashed. In considering a subse-
quent motion for summary judgment, however, 
the trial court ruled that the indemnity provi-
sion within the lien waivers was inapplicable, 
invalid, and unenforceable, and that Ellsworth 
was not responsible to indemnify SPR against 
any subcontractor claims. 
n2 The lien waiver provisions read, in 
pertinent part: 
In consideration of payment 
of this check, payee by ne-
gotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all 
right of lien or claims payee 
may have up to the date of 
the draw request described 
on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Draw Date"), upon the 
property described on the 
reverse side hereof (the 
"Property"). The payee certi-
fies that this check is pay-
ment for labor and materials 
that were actually performed 
upon and furnished to the 
Property. Payee warrants 
and guarantees under penalty 
of fraud that payment in full 
has been made by payee to 
the suppliers of all labor and 
materials to the Property in-
curred up to the Draw Date 
at the insistence of payee. 
Payee agrees to indemnify 
and hold harmless the owner 
of the Property and Central 
Bank or its assigns, from any 
loss, claims, or expenses in-
curred by them by reason of 
or rising out of any liens or 
claims made against the 
Property by any supplier of 
labor [or] material at the in-
sistence of payee. 
shore Property, Broadstone had defaulted 
on the two construction loans. 
[**6] 
n4 Several of Ellsworth's subcontrac-
tors also filed mechanics' liens and the 
trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the subcontractors who had filed 
liens. To avoid foreclosure of those liens, 
SPR apparently paid those claims, leav-
ing only Ellsworth's lien and contract 
claims remaining to be resolved. Thus, 
this appeal involves only Ellsworth's 
claims against SPR. 
[**5] 
[*P7] After Hatch disappeared and the 
loan funds were exhausted, Ellsworth learned 
of SPR's involvement in the project and ap-
proached SPR directly for payment for the 
completed work. SPR, viewing itself as a mere 
investor or limited partner, disclaimed any ob-
ligation to pay Ellsworth or its subcontractors. 
n3 Ellsworth then filed a mechanic's lien 
against Building I and Building II, and com-
menced this action to foreclose the lien. n4 Af-
ter initially ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment that there was a question of fact con-
cerning whether Ellsworth's lien had been 
timely filed, the trial court reconsidered its rul-
ing and concluded that the mechanic's lien was 
timely filed and otherwise valid. Also on sum-
mary judgment, the trial court dismissed Ells-
worth's claim that SPR failed to obtain a pay-
men* bond. 
n3 Shortly before Hatch disappeared, 
SPR learned of Hatch's purported misuse 
of the Northshore Property construction 
funds, SPR confronted Hatch, and Hatch 
agreed to relinquish to SPR Broadstone's 
one-half interest in the property. By the 
time SPR assumed control of the North-
[*P8] Ellsworth brought additional claims 
against Hatch and Broadstone for, among other 
things, failure to pay amounts due under two 
construction contracts entered into pursuant to 
the Agreement. Ellsworth brought those same 
claims against SPR on the theory that SPR was 
in a joint venture relationship with Hatch and 
Broadstone in the development of the North-
shore Property. SPR defended against these 
claims by initiating, in a separate proceeding 
which was later consolidated into this lawsuit, 
an action to quiet title in Building I and Build-
ing II. SPR also brought claims against Ells-
worth under Utah's abusive lien statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2005), for includ-
ing in its lien claim [**7] $ 78,000 that SPR 
asserted was attributable to an unrelated project 
on which Hatch and Ellsworth were collaborat-
ing without SPR's involvement. 
[*P9] A three-day bench trial was held on 
the issues not previously decided on summary 
judgment. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
court ruled in Ellsworth's favor on its lien and 
breach of contract claims in the amount of just 
over $ 721,000. Although it disallowed the 
claim for $ 78,000, the trial court denied SPR's 
related abusive lien argument, holding that 
Ellsworth had acted in good faith in including 
the $ 78,000 in its lien claim and had not in-
tended to exact more from SPR than was due. 
The trial court also granted Ellsworth attorney 
fees as the prevailing party under the lien stat-
ute, but refused to award Ellsworth pre-
judgment contractual interest on its final three 
draws because Ellsworth never submitted those 
final draws and, thus, the court could not fix a 
date at which the contract was breached and 
from which interest began to accrue. Both sides 
now appeal various aspects of the trial court's 
resolution of this complicated dispute. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Joint Venture Ruling 
[*P10] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred in [**8] concluding, on partial summary 
judgment, that it was in a joint venture relation-
ship with Broadstone and Hatch. Specifically, 
SPR attacks the trial court's conclusion that 
SPR had a duty to share in the losses of the 
Northshore Property. Because there is a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding the key is-
sue of whether SPR agreed to share losses with 
Broadstone and Hatch, we reverse the trial 
court's partial summary judgment ruling. 
[*P11] The "duty to share in any losses" is 
one of the elements of a joint venture relation-
ship that the Utah Supreme Court has deemed 
to be "essential" to the existence of such a rela-
tionship. Bassett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah 
1974), n5 See also Bet ens on v. Call Auto & 
Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
1982). It goes without saying that a duty to 
share losses is present in a relationship where a 
"written agreement specifically provide[s] for 
the sharing of losses." Harline v. Campbell, 
728 P.2d 980, 983 (Utah 1986). Likewise, 
where the sharing of losses is "specifically ex-
cluded by [an] agreement," no duty to share 
losses can be found to support a conclusion that 
parties are in [**9] a joint venture relationship. 
Betenson, 645 P. 2d at 686. Where, however, an 
agreement fails to specifically provide for or 
exclude a duty to share losses-which we con-
clude is true of the Agreement in this case-
courts are faced with a more difficult determi-
nation. 
n5 The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated the "essential" elements of the 
joint venture relationship as follows: 
The parties must combine 
their property, money, ef-
fects, skill, labor and knowl-
edge. As a general rule, there 
must be a community of in-
terest in the performance of 
the common purpose, a joint 
proprietary interest in the 
subject matter, a mutual 
right to control, a right to 
share in the profits, and 
unless there is an agreement 
to the contrary, a duty to 
share in any losses which 
may be sustained. 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah 
1974). The trial court concluded on 
summary judgment that all the other es-
sential elements were also present in the 
relationship between SPR and Broad-
stone, a conclusion SPR does not dispute 
on appeal. 
[**10] 
[*P12] Ellsworth argues that in such in-
stances a duty to share losses may be inferred 
from an agreement or from the nature of the 
parties' relationship, especially when all the 
other elements of a joint venture relationship 
are present. While the Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that "the agreement to share losses 
need not necessarily be stated in specific terms 
. . . to permit [a] court to infer that the parties 
intend[ed] to share losses as well as profits," 
Bassett, 530 P. 2d at 2, Utah case law does not 
appear to support the notion advanced by Ells-
worth that Utah courts have routinely made 
such an inference on summary judgment. In-
stead, "any doubt concerning questions of fact, 
including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in 
favor of the [party opposing summary judg-
ment]." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick 
Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App 1989). 
Inferring on summary judgment a duty to share 
losses runs counter to this precept. n6 
n6 It appears, then, that in most in-
stances where there is no express agree-
ment between parties concerning the 
sharing of losses, the question of whether 
one has a duty to share in losses will or-
dinarily be a question of fact—just as the 
overarching question of "[w]hether a 
joint venture exists is ordinarily a ques-
tion of fact," Strand v. Cranney, 607 
P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 79S0J--because the 
joint venture relationship itself "does not 
always arise pursuant to formal agree-
ment." Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). Of course, 
where the facts are truly not in dispute, 
the duty to share losses, or the existence 
of a joint venture for that matter, may be 
determined as a matter of law. See Bas-
sett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). 
[**11] 
[*P13] The trial court concluded that 
"[t]he terms of the Agreement, SPR's owner-
ship interest in the Project, and SPR's undis-
puted actions all gave rise to SPR's duty to 
share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project." Ellsworth argues that the trial 
court properly inferred from the Agreement, 
SPR's undisputed actions, and the other undis-
puted facts that SPR had the duty to share in 
losses. We disagree because when "we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to [SPR]," 
there is a genuine dispute of fact on a material 
issue, which precludes summary judgment. 
Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 
2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P3d 338. See also Bee-
hive. 780P2dat832. 
[*P14] "A genuine issue of fact exists 
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, 
reasonable minds could differ' on any material 
issue." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 
P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
Here, on the material issue of whether SPR had 
a duty to share losses, a genuine issue of fact 
arises out of reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from a combination of [**12] the 
Agreement itself; the affidavit testimony of 
Robert Chimento, the owner of SPR; and other 
undisputed facts before the court. 
[*P15] Although the trial court regarded 
Chimento's affidavit testimony as nothing more 
than "bald assertions" and "conclusory allega-
tions" that did not "create any genuine issue of 
material fact" because they were "sharply con-
tradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts," we conclude that 
Chimento's affidavit did create an issue of fact 
concerning the duty to share losses. Indeed, 
when Chimento's affidavit testimony is viewed 
together with the Agreement's provisions, sev-
eral of the provisions, rather than "sharply con-
tradicting]" his testimony, actually lend cre-
dence to his assertions and give rise to reason-
able inferences favorable to SPR's position. 
[*P16] Chimento's affidavit asserts that 
under the Agreement the narties intended to 
make Hatch and Broadstone solely responsible 
for "all expenses, costs, losses, and risks asso-
ciated with the Northshore project and did not 
intend to make SPR liable for any losses, li-
abilities, or responsibilities, meaning that SPR 
stood only to lose its capital investment in the 
[**13] Northshore Property. The provisions in 
the Agreement that expressly release SPR from 
all obligations arising by way of any note or 
guaranty for construction financing and instead 
place the sole obligation of obtaining and re-
paying construction financing and other cash 
needs of the project on Broadstone and Hatch, 
at the very least give rise to the inference that 
SPR did not agree to share in other financial 
obligations, i.e., the net operating losses of the 
Northshore Property. Additionally, the Agree-
ment's terms guarantying SPR "a 10% return on 
its capital commencing December 1, 2000," 
with Broadstone and Hatch guarantying to even 
"contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return," support 
Chimento's affidavit and the inference that even 
if the project lost money, Broadstone alone 
bore the responsibility to contribute funds to 
cover the losses and to ensure that SPR, as an 
investor, received its guarantied return. 
[*P17] Other terms of the Agreement that 
the trial court interpreted as having "essentially 
put SPR's $ 2.9 million immediately at risk 
should the venture completely fail" and making 
"SPR one-half owner of a tenancy in common 
with all the [**14] accompanying liabilities of 
a real property owner," when viewed in their 
proper light on summary judgment, together 
with Chimento's affidavit, also give rise to 
equally plausible inferences that contradict the 
trial court's conclusion that SPR agreed to share 
in the losses of the project. n7 In addition, 
SPR's "undisputed actions" on which the trial 
court relied to conclude SPR was not acting as 
a mere investor-i.e., "when it agreed with Cen-
tral Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee 'Broad-
stone's' [$ ]4.3 million construction loans" and 
when it "voluntarily conveyed the Project prop-
erty to Broadstone for one day in January 2001 
so that Broadstone could secure additional fi-
nancing for the Project" n8 -when viewed in 
the light most favorable to SPR, also support 
the assertion that SPR may not have agreed to 
share in losses. 
n7 For example, the fact that SPR's 
capital investment was put at risk by the 
Agreement quite reasonably supports the 
inference that SPR, like any investor, 
stood only to lose its investment and 
nothing more if the project failed. More-
over, much like in the realm of partner-
ships, holding property as tenants in 
common does not by itself establish a 
joint venture relationship. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-4(2) (2002) ("Joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, tenancy by entire-
ties, joint property, common property, or 
part ownership does not of itself establish 
a partnership, whether such co-owners do 
or do not share any profits made by the 
use of the property."). 
[**15] 
n8 The trial court inferred from these 
actions that "[SPR] voluntarily put its 
own property at greater risk of loss" than 
would an "investor" or "simple creditor," 
and that SPR had thereby waived the pro-
tection of language in the Agreement 
limiting SPR's obligation arising by rea-
son of any note or guaranty for construc-
tion financing. The court concluded that 
these actions manifested SPR's duty to 
share in losses. But it is equally plausible 
to infer from such actions that SPR was 
merely acting to protect its investment— 
and the potential return on its invest-
ment—by seeking to avoid foreclosure of 
the construction loans. Moreover, by 
mortgaging its interest in the Northshore 
Property, SPR did put the property at 
risk, but arguably only stood to lose its 
capital investment—which was used to 
purchase the property in the first place— 
and notLing more. 
[*P18] While we do not suggest that the 
inferences the trial court drew from the Agree-
ment and other evidence before it are necessar-
ily incorrect, the fact that there are other 
equally plausible inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence manifests [**16] that summary 
judgment should not have been granted. See 
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, P18, 44 
P.3d 704 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) 
("Where, as here, equally plausible contrary 
inferences may be drawn, neither party should 
have been granted summary judgment."). In-
deed, 
[a] party opposing the motion is 
required only to show that there is 
a material issue of fact. Affidavits 
and depositions submitted in sup-
port of and in opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment may be 
used only to determine whether a 
material issue of fact exists, not to 
determine whether one party's case 
is less persuasive than another's or 
is not likely to succeed in a trial on 
the merits. 
Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 
926, 928 (Utah 1993). We therefore reverse the 
trial court's judgment on this issue and remand 
for a determination by the fact finder whether 
SPR had a duty to share in the losses of the pro-
ject. n9 
n9 SPR would have us rule as a mat-
ter of law that it had no duty to share in 
the losses and was therefore not a joint 
venturer with Broadstone. Even if we 
were o^ agree that the affidavits and un-
disputed facts entitled SPR to that con-
clusion as a matter of law-which we do 
not—SPR did not file a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, and we would there-
fore be procedurally constrained from en-
tering judgment in its favor on this issue 
in any event. 
[**17] 
II. Timeliness of Ellsworth's Mechanic's 
Lien 
[*P19] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred when it determined on summary judg-
ment that Ellsworth's mechanic's lien was 
timely filed on November 16, 2001. Specifi-
cally, SPR claims the trial court erred in con-
cluding that there was nontrivial, substantial 
work performed on Building I and Building II 
in September 2001 and October 2001 at "the 
request of Broadstone and/or SPR" and that the 
ninety-day filing period did not begin to run 
until that work was completed. SPR asserts that 
there were, on the record before the court, 
genuine issues of material fact concerning 
whether the Building I contract was completed 
by May 2001, whether the Building II contract 
was completed by July 2001, and whether any 
work performed after these dates fell within the 
scope of the original building contracts and was 
substantial enough to preclude the start of the 
ninety-day filing period. Likewise, SPR con-
tends there is a question of material fact con-
cerning when the owner's acceptance of Ells-
worth's work occurred. We agree with SPR that 
summary judgment on these issues was also 
improperly granted. 
[*P20] "Utah courts have articulated a 
two-prong [**18] test" for determining 
whether a mechanic's lien has been timely filed. 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander 
& Smith Assocs., 827 P. 2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Under the two-part test, "comple-
tion," as it appears in the applicable statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) (2005), occurs 
when (1) the work under the contract "has been 
'substantially completed,' leaving only minor or 
trivial work to be accomplished," and (2) the 
work '"has been accepted by the owner.'" Inte-
riors, 827 P.2d at 965 (citations omitted). "The 
decision as to whether the work at issue is sub-
stantial or trivial is fact sensitive," id. at 966, 
and "generally it is for the trier of fact to de-
termine whether the additional work was trivial 
or minor." Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 
P.2d 60, 62 (1973), Likewise, the question of 
owner acceptance is often fact dependent, espe-
cially where the owner is alleged to have with-
held acceptance until certain remaining items 
of work were completed. See Interiors, 827 
P.2d at 967-69, Of course, if the record is clear 
and the facts are undisputed, [**19] those 
questions may be determined as a matter of 
law. See Carlisle, 506 P. 2d at 62. Such, how-
ever, is not the case here. 
[*P21] While it appears to be undisputed 
that some work continued on Building I and 
Building II after May 2001 and July 2001, re-
spectively, both parties presented evidence on 
summary judgment that supported conflicting 
completion dates and cast doubt on the scope of 
the work performed on or after August 15, 
2001-ninety days before Ellsworth filed its 
mechanic's lien. When we view all of the facts 
and reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to SPR's posi-
tion, see Surety Underwriters v. E & C Truck-
ing, 2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P.3d 338; Beehive 
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 
831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), we conclude that 
there is a dispute of fact concerning (1) the date 
the buildings were completed, (2) the nature 
and scope of work performed on Building I af-
ter May 2001 and on Building II after July 
2001, and (3) when owner acceptance occurred. 
[*P22] The fact that SPR can point to 
documents wherein Ellsworth certified that the 
entire Building I contract was 100% [**20] 
complete in May 2001 and that a subcontract 
was 100% complete in March 2001-the same 
subcontract on which Ellsworth relies to con-
tend that work wpas still being performed on 
Building I as late as September 200In-
adequately puts into dispute Ellsworth's "living, 
breathing witness testimony" that "extensive 
work after the dates of substantial completion" 
and "after the date of [Ellsworth's] invoices" 
was performed pursuant to the original con-
tract. It also raises questions about the nature 
and triviality of work performed on Building I 
after those dates. Moreover, SPR raises a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding the substan-
tial or trivial nature of the work performed on 
Building I when any work performed after May 
2001 is considered in light of the total contract 
price. See Interiors, 827 P.2d at 967 (approv-
ing trial court's conclusion that substantial 
completion had occurred where work per-
formed after the completion date had a de 
minimis dollar value in comparison to the total 
contract price); Carlisle, 506 P. 2d at 62 (same). 
[*P23] In addition, evidence that Ells-
worth certified that the Building II contract was 
100% complete in July 2001 [**21] and that 
its subcontractors' invoices reflecting that they 
had completed all their work by July 2001-
even though the same subcontractors performed 
more work on Building II after July 2001 — 
raises a genuine issue of material fact concern-
ing when substantial completion occurred. This 
determination is especially unclear in light of 
evidence SPR advanced to show the minimal 
value of the work performed after July 2001. 
[*P24] Ellsworth asserts that SPR's con-
tentions should fail "in the face of compelling— 
if not overwhelming-evidence that contravenes 
[SPR's] conclusory contentions" and "in the 
face of extensive testimony by subcontractors 
and [Ellsworth] that they were all performing 
thousands-perhaps tens of thousands—of dol-
lars of work on the project during the months of 
August, September and October." Ellsworth's 
assertions are unavailing, however, since sum-
mary judgment cannot be granted based on the 
credibility and weight of the parties' respective 
evidence. See Lamb v. B & B Amusements 
Corp., 869 P2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (stating 
that the evidence presented on summary judg-
ment "may be used only to determine whether a 
material issue of fact exists, not [**22] to de-
termine whether one party's case is less persua-
sive than another's or is not likely to succeed in 
a trial on the merits"). nlO On the contrary, 
"[t]rial courts must avoid weighing evidence 
and assessing credibility when ruling on mo-
tions for summary judgment." ni l Trujillo v. 
Utah Dep't of Tramp., 1999 UT App 227\ P42, 
986 P. 2d 752. As noted above, to oppose a mo-
tion for summary judgment a party Mis required 
only to show that there is a material issue of 
fact," and not to show that "one party's case is 
less persuasive than another's or is not likely to 
succeed in a trial on the merits." Lamb, 869 
P. 2d at 928. We therefore reverse the court's 
judgment on this issue and remand for appro-
priate reconsideration of the issue of lien time-
liness. 
nlO This familiar pronouncement is 
contrary to a startling statement by Pro-
fessor David A. Thomas that a Utah Su-
preme Court case, McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1980), supports the 
proposition that "[e]ven if the averments 
of the parties are in disagreement, sum-
mary judgment can be granted based on 
the credibility of the parties' respective 
evidence." David A. Thomas, Utah Civil 
Practice § 8.14[5][c][i], at 8-102 (2005). 
But the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
trial court's grant of summary dismissal 
in McBride actually stands for quite the 
opposite proposition. See 615 P. 2d at 
432-34. 
[**23] 
nl 1 The trial court's summary judg-
ment ruling includes "Findings" that, in-
deed, appear to be true findings of fact 
reached by weighing evidence and as-
sessing credibility rather than the mis-
nomer we often see employed in a writ-
ten ruling on summary judgment, where 
what is really a recitation of undisputed 
facts will appear under the heading 
"Findings." 
III. Ellsworth's Inclusion of $ 78,000 in its 
Lien Claim 
[*P25] Both parties appeal the trial court's 
ruling concerning $ 78,000 Ellsworth included 
in its lien claim. Ellsworth contends that since 
it was entitled to claim the $ 78,000 as part of 
its lien claim, the trial court erred in not award-
ing the $ 78,000 as part of its lien and contract 
claims. SPR contends that the trial court erred 
in not holding Ellsworth liable under Utah's 
abusive lien statute for including the $ 78,000 
in its lien claim on the Northshore Property for 
work performed on an unrelated piece of prop-
erty. We take up each contention in turn. 
A. Ellsworth's claim to the $ 78,000 
[*P26] Ellsworth argues that the trial court 
erred by not holding SPR liable to pay [**24] 
Ellsworth the $ 78,000, advancing several theo-
ries on appeal in support of its contention. We 
conclude, however, that the trial court was cor-
rect. Given the trial court's findings and conclu-
sions, Ellsworth is not entitled to recover the $ 
78,000 under any of the theories advanced. The 
trial court explicitly found that Ellsworth paid 
the $ 78,000 to Hatch for work on the proposed 
development of a different piece of property, 
that it did not relate to Hatch's agreements with 
Mr. Chimento and SPR for the construction of 
Building I and Building II, and that Broadstone 
was responsible for repaying the amount to 
Ellsworth. Ellsworth has made no earnest at-
tempt on appeal to challenge the trial court's 
findings concerning the $ 78,000. See Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, PI9, 100 P.3d i n ("In 
order to establish that a particular finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in sup-
port as to be against the clear weight of the evi-
dence.'") (citation omitted). 
[*P27] The plain language of the Mechan-
ics' Liens statute makes [**25] clear that Ells-
worth was only entitled to record or file a "lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which [it 
has] rendered service, performed labor, or fur-
nished or rented materials or equipment for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed, 
or materials or equipment furnished or rented." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2005). Although 
Ellsworth would be entitled to file a lien for 
services rendered even if the planned develop-
ment never occured, the lien must nevertheless 
be filed against "the property concerning which 
[it] has rendered professional service." Zions 
First Natl Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
464 P.2d 387, 388 (1970). Given that the trial 
court found the $ 78,000 was not related to the 
Northshore Property, but rather to another of 
Hatch's projects, Ellsworth was not entitled to 
include the $ 78,000 as part of its lien on the 
Northshore Property. 
[*P28] Ellsworth insists, however, that the 
trial court's findings do not prevent the conclu-
sion that when Hatch signed a change order 
indicating that the $ 78,000 was to be part of 
the Building II contract, Hatch made the $ 
78,000 a "partnership" debt, for which SPR 
[**26] should be equally responsible. But even 
assuming that a joint venture existed between 
Hatch and SPR, the trial court's findings pre-
vent imposing liability on SPR for the change 
order. 
[*P29] It is true that "[e]very partner is an 
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its 
business, and the act of every partner . . . binds 
the partnership," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6(1) 
(2002), but that binding authority does not ex-
tend to "[a]n act of a partner which is not ap-
parently for the carrying on of the business of 
the partnership in the usual way." Id. § 48-1-
6(2). The business of this alleged partnership or 
joint venture was the development of the 
Northshore Property. And the findings are clear 
that the $ 78,000 was unrelated to the North-
shore Property and not part of the Agreement 
between Hatch and SPR. By the trial court's 
findings, then, the $ 78,000 was for use on an-
other of Hatch's own business undertakings, 
completely unrelated to the Northshore Prop-
erty. Absent some showing that the trial court's 
findings in this regard were incorrect and ab-
sent an affirmative finding that the $ 78,000 
was indeed related to the business of this al-
leged partnership, [**27] Hatch's act of sign-
ing a change order in an apparent attempt to 
make his unrelated obligation part of the part-
nership business has no binding effect on SPR 
under partnership law. nl2 See id. We therefore 
decline to disturb the trial court's findings and 
conclusions concerning Ellsworth's inclusion of 
this $ 78,000 in its lien claim. 
nl2 A more simplistic example may 
help to explain our analysis: Aimee and 
Brian form a partnership in order to pur-
chase and develop property into a strip 
mall Aimee and Brian contract with 
general contractor Catherine to develop 
the land. Construction progresses as ex-
pected with Aimee and Brian signing 
various change orders throughout the 
project. During the construction, Brian 
offers to buy a pair of skis that he notices 
on Catherine's truck. Catherine is willing 
to sell them, and she and Brian decide on 
a price of $ 500. Brian, a little short on 
cash, memorializes the deal on a change 
order form, assuring Catherine she will 
be paid in due course. Toward the end of 
construction, Brian loots the remaining 
construction loan funds and absconds to 
Venezuela, taking with him the skis for 
which he neve. naid. Aimee is unable to 
pay the outstanding draw requests and 
Catherine files a mechanic's lien on the 
property and institutes a breach of con-
tract action and an action to foreclose the 
lien. Catherine includes the $ 500 change 
order amount for the skis in her lien 
claim and also seeks recovery of the $ 
500 from Aimee as a partnership debt. 
Clearly, Catherine is not entitled to re-
cover the $ 500 as part of her lien or 
from Aimee as a partnership debt. Al-
though a little more involved than the 
simple purchase of a pair of skis for $ 
500, the situation is essentially the same 
here given the trial court's unchallenged 
findings. 
[**28] 
B. Violation of Utah's Abusive Lien Statute 
[*P30] The question remains whether the 
trial court properly concluded that Ellsworth 
did not violate Utah's abusive lien statute by 
including $ 78,000 as part of its lien claim 
when the trial court ultimately held that Ells-
worth was not entitled to do so. The trial court 
concluded that although Ellsworth was not enti-
tled to include the $ 78,000 amount in its lien 
claim, it "acted in good faith in claiming the $ 
78,000." The court found that Ellsworth had 
filed the lien pursuant to Hatch's change order 
and Hatch's instructions, and that Ellsworth did 
not cause the lien to be filed with an intent to 
cloud the title of the property, to exact more 
than it believed was due, or to procure an un-
justified advantage. SPR contends the abusive 
lien statute does not condition liability on a lien 
claimant's subjective belief that it is seeking 
more than is due and does not require a show-
ing that the lien claimant specifically intended 
to exact more than is due. Thus, SPR contends 
that Ellsworth should have been penalized un-
der the abusive lien statute for including $ 
78,000 more in its lien claim than it was legiti-
mately owed for work on the Northshore 
[**29] Property. We disag^e. 
[*P31] The abusive lien statute provides 
that "[a]ny person entitled to record or file a 
lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim 
of lien against any property, which contains a 
greater demand than the sum due to be re-
corded or filed" and the person does so "(a) 
with the intent to cloud the title; (b) to exact 
from the owner or person liable by means of 
the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or 
benefit." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1) (2005). 
nl3 The statute is peculiarly phrased, in that 
while the language of subsection (1) provides 
that the lien claimant must intentionally cause a 
lien to be filed that demands more that the lien 
claimant is due, one of the subsections provides 
a further requirement concerning mental state 
while the other two do not. Thus, subsection 
(l)(a) speaks of "the intent to cloud the title," 
while subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) do not fur-
ther prescribe what culpable mental state the 
lien claimant must have with respect to filing 
the lien "to exact . . . more than is due" or "to 
procure any unjustified [**30] advantage or 
benefit." Id. But the abusive lien statute is a 
criminal statute and it does not "clearly indi-
cate]] a legislative purpose" to impose strict 
liability for the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (2003). As a result, the default culpable 
mental state of "intent, knowledge, or reckless-
ness shall suffice to establish criminal respon-
sibility" under the last two variants of the abu-
sive lien statute. nl4 Id. 
nl3 Besides the bite the criminal 
penalty puts into the abusive lien statute, 
a person who violates the statute is also 
liable "to the owner of the property or an 
original contractor or subcontractor who 
is affected by the lien for the greater of 
double the amount by which the lien ex-
ceeds what is actually due, or the actual 
damages incurred. Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-25(2) (2005). 
nl4 Construing the abusive lien stat-
ute in this manner comports with the 
"fair import" of the statute's terms and 
"the objects of the law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-106 (2003). Moreover, it assures 
that the abusive lien statute continues "to 
discourage outrageous lien claims," J. 
PochynokCo. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UTApp 
375, PI9, 80 P.3d 563, rev'd on other 
grounds, 2005 UT 39, 116 P. 3d 353, and 
"abuse of the lien process by creating a 
strong disincentive for a would-be liti-
gant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's lien 
on a property owner whose property was 
not actually enhanced," A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47, P24, 94 P.3d 270, without 
chilling a legitimate lien claimant's right 
to file a mechanic's lien for any amount 
that may be due. Thus, lien claimants 
need to be wary of using the mechanic's 
lien process to intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly seek more than they are 
due, or to push some other abusive ad-
vantage. But where a lien proves to have 
been overstated for some other reason 
that does not violate the abusive lien 
statute, claimants need not fear the 
criminal liability or civil penalties the 
statute imposes. 
[**31] 
[*P32] The trial court specifically found 
that Ellsworth "did not cause the lien to be filed 
with the intent to cloud the property to exact 
more than it believed was due or procure an 
unjustified advantage." Although SPR contends 
that this finding is immaterial because the abu-
sive lien statute does not require a showing of 
an intent "to exact . . . by means of the exces-
sive claim of lien more than is due," Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-l-25(l)(b), given our application of 
the default culpable mental state as explained 
above the finding is pertinent to the trial 
court's holding. Despite SPR's thorough efforts 
to marshal the evidence and challenge several 
of the trial court's findings, SPR has not estab-
lished that these findings are clearly erroneous. 
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P19, 100 
P. 3d 1177. Although SPR asserts that its diffi-
cultly in marshaling the evidence supporting a 
finding of no intent typifies the problem inher-
ent in proving a negative, SPR has ignored evi-
dence that supports the inference that Ellsworth 
did not intentionally, or even recklessly, in-
clude the $ 78,000 to exact more than it be-
lieved it was due. 
[*P33] [**32] Ellsworth relied on 
Hatch's signed change order referencing the 
Northshore Property as providing a contractual 
basis under which it could include the $ 78,000 
in its lien claim on the Northshore Property. 
While Ellsworth's reliance ultimately has 
proven to be incorrect, it at least provides evi-
dence that tends to support the finding that 
Ellsworth included the amount based on what it 
thought was a legitimate and binding change 
order and did not intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly include the amount to exact more 
than was due. 
[*P34] Although SPR points to other evi-
dence giving rise to inferences about what 
Ellsworth knew or did not know about the $ 
78,000, we are not convinced that the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous. Thus, 
although Ellsworth "intentionally cause[d] a 
claim of lien . . . which contain[ed] a greater 
demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed," it did not do so with the requisite culpa-
ble mental state to cloud the title, to exact from 
the owner more than was due, or to procure 
some other unjustified advantage. 
IV. Lien Waivers 
[*P35] We next consider two aspects of 
the applicability of the lien waivers at issue in 
this case. With [**33] respect to both, we re-
mand for further consideration. 
A. Application of Lien Waivers 
[*P36] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred by ultimately not applying the lien waiv-
ers after correctly concluding before trial that 
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable. 
nl5 We admit we are slightly puzzled by the 
trial court's handling of the lien waiver issue, 
especially since neither party points us to a 
clear finding or explanation concerning why 
none of the lien waivers, held to be valid and 
enforceable in the abstract, were made applica-
ble by the trial court. Indeed, both sides assert 
different draw dates that are supposed to have 
cut off Ellsworth's lien rights for work per-
formed prior to those dates. SPR asserts dates 
(April 11 and June 25, 2001) that if found to be 
the draw dates would indeed waive Ellsworth's 
right to file a lien for some portions of the work 
it claimed in its mechanic's lien. The draw 
dates on which Ellsworth relies (each sometime 
in February 2001) would support the conclu-
sion that no portion of its lien claim was 
waived by the April and June checks to which 
SPR cites in support of its position. 
nl5 On summary judgment, the trial 
court deemed the lien waivers applicable 
and held with respect to the lien waiver 
language that 
[b]y endorsing the Central 
Bank checks, Ellsworth . . . 
waived [its] claims and lien 
rights for work performed 
prior to the date that [its] 
draws were requested, but 
not for work performed sub-
sequently. The date of the 
draw request is the date on 
which [Ellsworth] requested 
the draw, not the date the 
check was received or 
cashed. 
This ruling was not challenged on appeal. 
[**34] 
[*P37] Despite Ellsworth's contention that 
the trial court "implicitly" found at trial that 
there was no portion of the lien claim that was 
waived by the April and June checks, and de-
spite its assertion that it put on extensive evi-
dence supporting such a finding, the conflicting 
evidence and the lack of a clear ruling by the 
trial court prevents us from subscribing to 
Ellsworth's position. We therefore remand the 
issue for the trial court to clarify its treatment 
of the valid lien waivers and to make related 
findings relevant thereto. 
B. Indemnity, Warranty, and Guaranty 
Language of the Lien Waiver Provisions 
[*P38] We reverse the trial court's sum-
mary judgment ruling that, although the lien 
waivers were otherwise valid and enforceable, 
the indemnity language in the lien waiver pro-
visions was "inapplicable, invalid and unen-
forceable." We give no particular deference to a 
trial court's interpretation of unambiguous con-
tract language on summary judgment. See 
Meadow Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Transcontinen-
tal Ins. Co., 2001 UTApp 190, PI3, 27 P.3d 
594. As the lien waiver provisions are contrac-
tual in nature, when interpreting their language 
we "look[] at [**35] the entire contract and all 
of its parts in relation to each other, giving an 
objective and reasonable construction to the 
contract as a whole." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 
P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982). The trial court's 
yiew of what was required in order for the in-
demnity language to be applicable miscon-
strued its purpose in the lien waiver provision 
and unreasonably read the indemnity language 
out of the lien waivers. Likewise, when the 
guaranty and warranty language of the lien 
waiver provisions is properly construed in the 
context of the lien waiver agreement, those 
provisions are also valid and enforceable. 
[*P39] Here, as part of the valid lien 
waiver provisions, the applicability of the in-
demnity and guaranty language hinges on the 
relevant draw dates for each check, as is so 
with the specific lien waiver language itself. 
Under the plain language of the lien waiver 
provisions, when construed together as a 
whole, the M[p]ayee warrants and guarantees" 
that through the draw dates "payment in full 
has been made . . . to the suppliers of all labor 
and materials to the Property incurred at the 
insistence of payee." To the extent "any liens or 
claims" are "made [**36] against the Property 
by any supplier of labor [or] material" provided 
up through the relevant draw date, the payee, 
by signing the lien waiver provision, "agrees to 
indemnify and hold harmless the owner of the 
Property . . . from any loss, claims, or expenses 
incurred by [the Property owner] by reason of 
or rising out of any liens or claims made 
against the Property." Thus, as with the ques-
tion of whether Ellsworth has waived any 
amounts contained in its mechanic's lien claim, 
whether Ellsworth must indemnify SPR for any 
of the lien claims brought against it by Ells-
worth's subcontractors and suppliers depends 
on whether any of those liens arose out of work 
performed before the draw date of a specific 
check that Ellsworth signed and also guarantied 
that it had paid. As to any such lien or claim, 
Ellsworth would be responsible for the pay-
ment by way of its guaranty and its agreement 
to indemnify the Property owner therefor. Ac-
cordingly, we remand for the trial court to 
make any additional findings necessary to de-
termine the effect, if any, the indemnity, war-
ranty, and guaranty language has on the liens 
filed against the Northshore Property and to 
determine any relief to which SPR [**37] may 
be entitled under those provisions. 
V. Prejudgment Interest 
[*P40] Ellsworth appeals the trial court's 
prejudgment interest determination. While we 
need not address this issue as our decision to-
day reverses the final judgment in several re-
spects and remands several issues for the trial 
court's further consideration, we nonetheless 
choose to treat the prejudgment interest issue 
here because it could well arise again during 
the proceedings on remand. See Pair v. Axiom 
Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, P22, 20 P.3d 388 
("[W]here an appellate court finds that it is 
necessary to remand a case for further proceed-
ings, it has the duty of 'pass[ing] on matters 
which may then become material.'") (citation 
omitted). 
[*P41] Ellsworth argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing to award Ellsworth interest on 
the amounts of the three final payment applica-
tions as part of the prejudgment interest award. 
The trial court held that because it was undis-
puted that Ellsworth never submitted the three 
applications to anyone for payment, it was "not 
possible for the [c]ourt to set a specific date on 
which payment of the three unsubmitted appli-
cations became due," [**38] and it refused to 
"simply 'pick a date' from which interest 
beg[an] to accrue." Ellsworth argues that be-
cause the terms of its contract with Broadstone 
provide for contractual interest to accrue, it was 
entitled to interest accrued on the amounts of 
these three payment applications. 
[*P42] Ellsworth's contention that the trial 
court's ruling appears to blur the distinction be-
tween the requirements for receiving an award 
of contractual interest and those for receiving 
an award of prejudgment interest as a matter of 
damages is well taken. See Consolidation Coal 
Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 
886 P.2d 514, 528 n.23 (Utah 1994) ('"A dis-
tinction exists between interest stated by the 
terms of a contract to be paid before its breach 
and interest recoverable by way of damages 
after a breach, although the term "interest" is 
often used indiscriminately to describe both 
amounts.'") (citation omitted). "Prejudgment 
interest may be awarded in a case where the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy," Jorgensen v. John 
Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (*Jtah 1983), 
which makes [**39] such an award discretion-
ary and dependent on finding that the debt was 
or became liquidated. See Bjork v. April Indus., 
Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) (stating general 
requirements for receiving an award of pre-
judgment interest), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 
97 S Ct. 2634, 53 L Ed 2d 245 (1977). In con-
trast, "'[contractual interest is the creature of 
contract and is recoverable only as provided by 
its terms.'" Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 
528 n.23 (citation omitted). Where an agree-
merit provides for contractual interest to accrue, 
that interest becomes "an integral part of the 
debt as the principal itself/1 Farnworth v. Jen-
sen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (1950) 
(internal quotations, citation, and emphasis 
omitted), and it is not discretionarily awarded. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (2005) 
("[A] judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform to the contract and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the partiesf.]"). 
[*P43] The difficulty we have here with 
the trial court's treatment of the prejudgment 
interest issue is that, while explicitly holding 
that Ellsworth was [**40] "entitled to pre-
judgment contractual interest on its breach of 
contract claim as requested," the trial court 
nevertheless refused to award interest attribut-
able to the three payment applications. It is not 
clear whether the trial court did so because un-
der the general rules governing prejudgment 
interest the amounts due on the three payment 
applications were not liquidated, or whether the 
trial court determined that under the terms of 
the contract Ellsworth was not entitled to con-
tractual interest on the three payment applica-
tions because it never submitted them for pay-
ment. 
[*P44] It may very well be that under the 
terms of the contract Ellsworth is not entitled to 
interest on the payment applications because 
they were never submitted. The contract states, 
with our emphasis, that interest is to accrue at 
M[t]en percent (10%) per annum thirty (30) days 
after the date of the Invoice for payment." 
Since it was undisputed that Ellsworth never 
submitted the three applications, there appears 
to be no "date of the Invoice for payment" that 
marks the beginning of the thirty-day period 
before interest would begin to accrue, which 
under the plain language of the contract sug-
gests [**41] that contractual interest on those 
applications would be inappropriate. See Con-
solidation Coal, 886 P. 2d at 528 n.23. Yet if, 
as Ellsworth contends, the payment applica-
tions were never submitted because Hatch had 
disappeared and there was no one to whom 
they could have been submitted-and it appears 
to be somewhat disputed whether Ellsworth 
could have found Hatch and submitted the three 
payment applications-that may have bearing 
on whether Ellsworth may still recover interest 
under the contract. 
VI. Attorney Fees 
[*P45] SPR appeals from the trial court's 
award of attorney fees below, and Ellsworth 
requests we grant it attorney fees on appeal. 
Given our reversal of several of the trial court's 
rulings and given our remand, we must vacate 
the trial court's award of attorney fees because 
it is no longer clear who the prevailing party is. 
However, as was the case with the prejudgment 
interest issue, the attorney fee issue will present 
itself again on remand and requires brief com-
ment. 
[*P46] It is clear that Utah law requires 
the prevailing party, and ultimately the court, to 
allocate the prevailing party's attorney fees 
among those claims for which it is [**42] enti-
tled to an award of attorney fees and those for 
which it is not. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumb-
ing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 
87, P32, 977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P2d 
1271 (Utah 1999). SPR argues that because 
Ellsworth is not entitled under the contract to 
attorney fees for its breach of contract claim-
the contract contained no attorney fees provi-
sion—Ellsworth and the trial court failed to 
properly allocate those noncompensable attor-
ney fees related to the breach of contract claim 
and those compensable fees related to the me-
chanic's lien claim. 
[*P47] While it is true that under the me-
chanic's lien statute Ellsworth is not entitled "to 
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its nonlien 
claims which were 'completely separate,'" 
American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems 
Commun. Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct 
App. 1997) (citation omitted), the breach of 
contract claim here was so inextricably tied to 
the mechanic's lien claim as to warrant group-
ing these fees together. Indeed, it almost goes 
without saying that a breach of contract claim 
is typically such an integral part of a me-
chanic's lien claim that a party [**43] cannot 
pursue such a claim without also proving the 
existence of a contract, a payment due under 
the contract, and a breach of that contract by 
nonpayment. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P48] We remand this matter to the trial 
court for further consideration in accordance 
with this opinion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
[*P49] WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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THIS ADDINOUM # 2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND 51 SOUTH PORTLAND RIALTY CORP. DATED 
JUNE IS, 2000 
RE; Auto Mall Development 
The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above 
Real Estate Purchase Contract as if set forth et length therein. 
This memorandum shall summahre the terms of the agreements reached regarding the 
above development project and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the 
parties w*th regard thereto, as dosing of title on the real astate is needed by 6/15/00; 
thereafter more detailed agreements in appropriate form will be prepared *nd executed 
reflecting the following terms: 
- Utah title company as nominee for 51 South Portland Realty, , a New York 
corporation (Chimento), and , a Utah LLC fUtah LLC) (Guy Hatch and , his 
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions,) will acquire tide as ten$nts*ln*cornmon (with 
a 50% interest wi each) to the entire 6.58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises 
Corpc ation for the purchase prirr of $1,750,000.00 (the "Land"), 
- Chimento will contribute as capital to the project the sum of $2,900,000.00 to be 
transferred to and held by Utah Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary f QO and applied 
as follows: 
$1,750,000 • 
5,000(7) -
87,000 -
545,000 • 
fiUQWH -
to purchase 
To costs of purchase 
Commission to Re Max 
To site Improvement costs 
To building construction costs (see following) 
Total ; %900,ooo 
- Utah LLC $h*X be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed 
construction financing and Institutional permanent financing for Buildings I and U (hereinafter 
"office buildings"), construction supervision, liasing of the buildings, sate of the station/store 
site, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC wH receive a fte of $135,000.00 for such services, 
payable in three installments of $45,000.00 on July 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 end October 
15, 2000. 
- Utah LLC will provide financing for needed construction monies for the office butfdtng 
and remaining cash needs of the project, Guy Hatch will guaranty such nnatxjng. 
- Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy »n common interest to secure 
institutional construction financing but wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee 
at an/ time 
- Chimento funds for site development ^ construction costs "bard" costs only not 
"soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) will be utihxed prior to any other construction 
C\Xt OOCVkfttO JV*T>t*Lft5r KI31W%HOJX>C <3V 
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financing, on a standard draw schedule wrth 10% r e t a i n s (inclusive), to be rtltased by QI 
after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to be retained by Chimento and paid as a 
project cost 
* Utah LLC shall be a singte meittber, single purpose LLC satisfactory to NJ counsel for 
Chimento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah 
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement in recordablf form satisfactory to NJ 
counsel In favor of Chimento as to the LLC and the LLC's tenancy in common interest in the 
land, 
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to CWmehto to 
secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well Hatch's obligations pursuant to this 
memo. Chimento shall subordinate its mortgage only with respect to institutional constructs 
financing. Chimento win release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project 
and dosing of permanent institutional financing. 
Note: Chlmento's acquisition of its interest in the project is through a "Uke-Kind" exchange and 
where the term Chimento fc used, QI shall act as Chimeric's nominee until Chimento may take 
title pursuant to IR5 regulations. 
The parties intend that following completion of the project and at the time of permanent 
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC 
may transfer their interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equaty by them, otherwise 
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for 
investment and all actions by the parties? shall be In furtherance of that goal. (New Utah LLC 
documents to be satisfactory to NJ counsel for Chimento). 
- The development project shall bt on a cash basis with a calendar year end. 
- Chimento shall rtcervt a 10% return on Ks capital commencing December 1, 2000 
through the end of the first year following dosing on the und, to be paid monthly connmencing 
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be p3td from operating income of the project 
if sufficient, and if not# then from proceeds of sale of a portion of the land - the 
rtatton/conveoience mart, if any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return. 
- Any net operating income remaining in the first year, to Hatch. 
• Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year 
on terms set forth above for yew l, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project for 
the year following dosing on the Land. 
- Thereafte.' Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share SO/SO tn net operating income of the 
project. 
- Permanent financing w •* "take out" all financed construction costs (including soft costs 
and leasing costs) (No brokerage «s to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) ^ the project or 
buildings individual w* secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually. The parties 
agree to consult es to the amount of permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if 
«alA 
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agreed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the following order 
at availably (i) land closing costs; (il) allocated construction costs, i.e. building l and Uilldlng 
2; (ill) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building 1 and building 2; and (iv) allocated fend 
costs, i.e. building l *rvd 2; and after Oiknento capital repaid In full, ID each 50/50. 
- Subsequent capfol transactions (refinances, safes, casualty or cor>demnatk>n) after 
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 50/50. 
Distributions of net operating Income after completion of construction, to be made not less than 
quarterly. 
Distribution from capft*! transactions no later than 20 days after receipt. 
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made *fter consultation. 
Monthly construcboo and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch. 
Quarterly statements to be submitted within 30 fays of close of quarter. 
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year. 
Tax ret^ns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-ln-common within 75 days of close of 
Surh returns shall reflect Uud the property is heW as tenanU^n-common interests md not as a 
partnership. All such elections steH be made to be consistent with this. 
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter Into a consulting agreement with 
CNroentos, individually, wfch regard to property development Inclusive of the project, to a term 
running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of $24,000,00 ptc month payable montNy 
commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 1, 200Q payment shall be $12,00000). 
The provisions of this Addendum shaH survive closing of title. 
51 SOUTH PORTLAND WEALTY CORP. 
&ROADSTONE XNV*STMENTS, LlC 
C*JY JKXTUM^V^wTMi r i . t t * Mt»S\M*KO.DOC 
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801)576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD MILL 
& CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; the 
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons 
unknown claiming any interest to the subject 
real property, 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY AS JOINT 
VENTURER WITH AND 
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE 
Civil No. 020400442 
Civil No. 010405059 
Consolidated into 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Schofield 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company on the issue of 51-SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor 
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30, 
2002. 
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24, 
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLC's ("51-SPR" or 
"Chimento") liability as a joint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Broadstone Investments, 
LC ("Broadstone").1 51-SPR opposes the motion. 
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral 
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion. 
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services 
performed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project") 
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents. If Broadstone 
and 51 -SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51-SPR is jointly and severally liable for 
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the 
contracts to develop the Project. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-10 to -12; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 
218 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10 tp -12). 
1
 The central issue before the couit has been cast principally as one of joint venture. 
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly 
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable." (citing 
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 fn. 3 (Utah 1983). See also Utah Code Ann § 48-
1-3.1; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 1990) ("[§48-1-3.1] provides that joint 
ventures are governed by the partnership act."). 
9 
Summary Judgment Standard. 
Summary judgmpnt is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and 
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere 
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. See 
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). 
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question. Rogers v. M.O. 
Bitner, Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987). However, in this case, where the "facts are not in 
dispute . . . the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1974). 
Joint Venture Factors. 
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3.1. The Utah Supreme Court 
has declared Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the 
elements essential to a joint venture." Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 684,686 
(Utah 1982). Bassett states: 
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons 
ordinarily but not necessarily limited to a single transaction for the 
purpose of making a profit. The requirements for the relationship are 
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties 
must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor, and 
3 
knowledge. AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary 
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share 
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty 
to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
530 P.2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). In Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, the court states that "[a] joint venture 
does not always rise pursuant to formal agreement; rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by 
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties. The characterizations given by the 
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue." 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added). 
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51-
SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51-SPR was actively involved with Broadstone 
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit. While 
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager, 
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture. Both parties had a common interest 
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow. 
Background and Addendum #2. 
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company 
("Ford") for the purpose of acquiring the real property upon which the Northshore I and H buildings 
were constructed. While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford before Chimento did, Chimento 
admits to being involved m the acquisition of the property, in putting it under contract." The real 
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase price of the Northshore property at 
$1,750,000.00. On June 12, 2000, Ford conveyed the Northshore property to Broadstone by 
warranty deed. 
4 
It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the 
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document. It is also 
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is now owned by 51 -SPR 
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agreement refers to 51 South Portland Realty. 
The Agreement undisputedly provides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property 
as tenants in common; 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million, of which $1.75 million would be 
used to acquire the land, and another $1.2 million would be applied to site work and construction 
costs; 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager," would "operate the venture," would obtain 
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on 
the buildings; 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing; 
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized 
"on a standard draw schedule . . . after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer"; 6) Broadstone 
would be a single member single purpose company, whose "ownership interest and control shall be 
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in 
common interest to Chimento [51]SPR] to secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well [as] 
Hatch's obligations."2 
The Agreement also provides: 
[1] The parties intend that following completion of the project... but not earlier that 
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their 
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with 
2
 See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, pp. 8-9^ These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in 
Addendum #2. 
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the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and 
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (Agreement p. 2, 14); 
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 
2000 through the end of the first year following closing . . . to be paid monthly . . . 
. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project, 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land . . . if 
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment 
of such return. (Agreement p.2,16); 
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of 
Broadstone]. (Agreement p. 2, f 7); 
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second 
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of 
the project... (Agreement p. 2, 18); 
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income 
of the project. (Agreement p. 2, 16); 
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs... the project 
. . . will secure the same . . . . The parties agree to consult as to the amount of 
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be 
applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (i) 
land closing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; (iii) 
allocated site improvement costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; and after Chimento 
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50. (Agreement p.2, 110; 
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 
50/50. (Agreement p. 3i 11); 
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation. 
(Agreement p. 3,13); 
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch. (Agreement 
p. 3,14); and 
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting 
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development 
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of 
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$24,000.00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00. (Agreement p. 3, f 9). 
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter. 
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or partnership,^ 1-SPR's 
proprietary interests in the Project severely undermines its assertions that it was merely a "creditor" 
or "investor" on the Project. 51-SPR does not dispute that both parties had ownership interests in 
the Project, at the outset.4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee 
simple except for one day.5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building 
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51-SPR 
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt 
service the construction loan."6 
Mutual right to control. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4. 
4
 According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering 
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that 
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR." 51-SPR's response to 
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 15. However, 
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan 
Parkinson." Id. (citing Chimento Aff. at ^25). I note that regardless of the current ownership 
Status of the property (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy 
the "joint proprietary interest" factor in determining joint venture status. 
5
 51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to 
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day. 51-SPR's response 
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 12. 
6
 W.,p. 16, 111. (citing Chimento Dep. P. 125-26). 
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As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating 
to the Project. Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's right to control, but only 
insured that right. While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into 
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to 
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control . . . to Chimento" (Agreement p. 2, fl) (emphasis 
added).7 Significantly, the Agreement provided: "All decisions regarding the project shall be 
mutually made after consultation." (Agreement p. 3, |3) (emphasis added). 
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually 
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his 
property. Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not 
determinative of the control factor. The terms of the Agreement, together with 51-SPR's ownership 
of the property, unquestionably gave 51-SPR the right to exercise mutual control on "all decisions 
regarding the project." 
In addition, 51-SPR had the right to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the 
Agreement. It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and 
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project.8 Given 
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply 
7
 This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR. 
8
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
9
 Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then 
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the 
8 
cannot credit 51-SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority 
to develop and manage the Property."10 
Right to share in the profits. 
Utah law provides: "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima 
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4(4). While I do not 
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the 
right to share in the profits from the Project. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive 
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaranteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income 
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone. The second year, 51-SPR would have the option 
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project. 
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p. 
2, f 8) (emphasis added). Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his 
deposition.11 
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that 
it "merely agreed to serve as an investor or financier in the development of the Property."12 Mr. 
property. 
10
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
11
 Chimento Dep. pp. 137-138. 
12
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 20. 
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Chimento's affidavit sates: "51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or 
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose 
only its investment in the Property and nothing more."13 While these bald assertions contradict 
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact. 51-SPR's denials of liability 
are simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts. 
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's 
undisputed actions all gave rise to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project. There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything 
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-sharing duties were not spelled out in detail. 
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2.9 million immediately at risk should the 
venture completely fail. In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one-half owner14 of a tenancy in 
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and 
tort liabilities. The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to share losses by providing 
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional 
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time." 
13
 Chimento affidavit, 110. 
14
 In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest 
and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that 
"[Broadstone] shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento . . ." (Agreement, p. 2 
n 1-2). 
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(Agreement, p. 1,17) (emphasis added).15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this 
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4.3 million 
construction loans. 
Simply put, the Agreement and the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51-
SPR acting as a simple creditor to Broadstone. 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's 
loans to avoid foreclosure. Onb may wonder, however, whether foreclosure would have been so 
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51-SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position. In fact, 
however, 51-SPR voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January 
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project. In doing so, 51-SPR 
voluntarily put its own property at greater risk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture. 
The parties' characterizations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[tjhe characterizations given by the parties 
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, 738 P.2d 
1029, 1032. Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the 
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held for investment" or that the parties' tax 
returns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a 
partnership."16 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter written by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on 
15
 A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of 
joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture determination, the duty to 
share losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, P.2d 
(emphasis added). 
16
 Agreement, p. 2, f 4 and p. 3, fj 7-8. 
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October 9, 2001 is telling. Mr. Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the project by Guy 
Hatch and later states: 
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and 
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you 
to believe that you would be paid by now. If not for the economic uncertainty 
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would 
have closed by now. 
(emphasis added). 
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr. Chimento' s 
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project.18 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to services rendered 
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the 
Project.19 
17
 See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13. "When a person by words spoken or written or by 
conduct represents himself . . . to anyone as a partner . . . he is liable to any such person to whom 
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the 
actual or apparent partnership . .. When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were 
an actual member of the partnership .. . When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly 
with the other persons . . . so consenting to the . . . representation as to incur liability; otherwise 
separately." Id. 
18
 Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr. Chimento suggests that "[a]nother possibility" to 
ei.sure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind." Chimento suggests, "perhaps 
we could both make a profit." 
19
 While I believe it may be possible to conclude that 51-SPR was the principal owner of 
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today. Because 
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the 
12 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Siott 
On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial. 
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth 
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"). At the 
trial, the following issues were addressed: (1) the status of certain change orders; (2) abuse of 
lien right under U.C.A. §38-1-25; (3) wrongful hen under U.C.A. §38-9-1; (4) contract damages; 
and (5) attorney's fees. 
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Prior to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further 
support of their positions. After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the 
hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's 
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre-judgment interest calculation. The Court has 
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at trial, the relevant 
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following 
ruling: 
BACKGROUND 
51-SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L.C. 
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial 
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on real property located in 
American Fork, Utah. 
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984. Mr. 
Ellsworth has his general contractor's license and is an engineer. Guy Hatch was the apparent 
owner of the project in question. Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr. 
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork 
that consisted of approximately six buildings. Mr. Hatch acted as the construction manager of 
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project. 
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required 
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51-SPR. 
To finance construction of Building 1 and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction 
loans for each building from Central Bank. During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen 
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or Broadstone would submit periodic draw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for 
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings. The 
subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted draw requests for 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment requests which were 
submitted to Broadstone. Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the 
subcontractors. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the respective 
subcontractors. 
Because the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not fully paid for the services 
and materials provided to Building 1 and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against 
the property in the office of the Utah County recorder. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of 
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with 
the Utah County Recorder's Office. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on 
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified 
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely 
lis pendens. 
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a joint-
venture and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth PauLen, if any, by reason of 
its relationship with Broadstone. The parties are well-aware of the historical relationship 
between Broadstone and 51-SPR. This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information 
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought 
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the parties to the time of trial. Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and 
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial. 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
A. Change Orders 
1. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building 1 is in the amount of 
$199,830.53. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building II is in the amount of 
$364,991.26. These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and 
6, respectively. 
2 As to the property referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes 
that Guy Hatch contacted Mr. Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the 
development of the Williams property including Buildings 1 and II on the property in question. 
Mr. Hatch, the primary principal and owner of the property for Buildings 1 and II, requested that 
Mr. Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of 
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr. Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering 
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which 
included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project. 
The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch did not inform Mr. Ellsworth how the money was to be 
used and where the funds were to go. Mr. Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with 
Mr. Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects. Mr. Hatch instructed Mr. 
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that 
fashion. 
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4. As the result of a conversation with Mr. Hatch, Mr. Ellsworth was unsure how the 
$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineering would be involved on the 
project and Mr. Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000. 
5. Mr. Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr. Hatch, without 
determining where the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project. Mr. 
Ellsworth relied upon representations of Mr. Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of 
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broadstone would be 
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen. 
6. During the course of the project, Mr. Hatch disappeared. Ellsworth Paulsen 
attempted to find Mr. Hatch, but for a significant period of time was unable to do so. As of 
November 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the 
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr. Hatch. Mr. Hatch was eventually 
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii. A number of change 
orders had been requested by Mr. Hatch for the project in question; the work had been done by 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed. Eventually, Mr. Hatch agreed 
to sign all the change orders sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose. 
7. The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors 
working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen, 
and would make requests for changes. The work and changes requested by Mr. Hatch were 
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact. 
8. The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr. Natch 
were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as 
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr. Hatch on behalf of Broadstone 
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. The change orders took place in this 
fashion in both Building I and II. It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr. 
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders. In fact, 
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the 
architect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone. 
9. As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building I, 
all of the work requested in Mr. Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
10. Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for 
the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this 
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a 
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents. As the 
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and 
Mr. Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the 
time work began. The change orders were done at the request of Mr. Hatch without consultation 
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with 
Ellsworth Paulsen Instead, Mr. Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors 
to make changes 
11. By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders, 
Broadstone waived any claim that all the change orders must be signed and the court finds that 
all work requested by Mr. Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was 
completed. 
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12. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the $78,000 it 
paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and participation with respect to the Williams 
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of 
the Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the 
two North Shore buildings. 
B. Mr. Wilson 
13. The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson was the architect on the project and Mr. 
Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings 1 and II. Mr. Wilson contracted with 
Broadstone and Mr. Hatch for work he did on the project. The evidence does not indicate that 
Mr. Wilson ever dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he performed on the project. 
14. The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr. Hatch would meet with Mr. Wilson 
and discuss the status of the project. But Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr. Wilson 
out of the loop in requesting and approving change orders. Mr. Hatch himself contacted the 
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was eventually 
informed by Mr. Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on 
both Buildings of the Northshore project. 
15. Mr. Wilson, based upon his meetings with Mr. Hatch believed that all of the work 
required by Mr. Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order 
request. On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought cha^e 
orders to Mr. Wilson for his approval and signature. 
C. Mr. Chimento 
16. Mr. Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California. 51-SPR is an entity 
established by Mr. Chimento. Mr. Chimento and his brother met Mr. Hatch in approximately 
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1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr. Chimento 
referred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork. The testimony of Mr. Chimento 
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr. 
Chimento on behalf of 51-SPR and Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr. Hatch 
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings 1 and II. The 
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings 1 and 
II, Mr. Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR. 
17. The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the 
change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's 
interest in the project. 
18. Shortly before the completion of the project, Mr. Ellsworth became aware of Mr. 
Chimento and communication ensued between Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Chimento. Mr. Ellsworth 
advised Mr.' Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and 
Mr. Chimento assured Mr. Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what 
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the 
project. 
D. Notice of Interest 
19. The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was 
prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001. The Notice of Interest was 
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paui^en. Subsequent to 
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen 
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiffs Exhibit 26 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED 
TO THE PARTIES' CLAIMS 
L Breach of Contract 
20. This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-
venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence 
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests, 
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth 
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the 
work is defective or otherwise has problems. 
21. Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request. 
II. Abusive Lien 
22. 51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of hen right in 
which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated 
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of 
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the 
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by 
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone. 
23. Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following: 
Contactors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or 
improvemei t of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner. . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . . 
This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was 
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put in place at the instruction of Mr. Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth 
Paulsen for the $78,000. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed, 
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the 
construction of Buildings I and II. Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon the 
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien. 
24. Section 38-1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon 
those parties who commit an abuse of lien right. This Section states: 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any 
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive 
claim of lien more than is due: or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who 
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original 
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount 
actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a lien against the property in question, 
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was 
due or procure an unjustified advantage. 
25. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000 
based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch and Broadstone. The Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had 
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr Hatch, the owner of the property The 
recording of the hen was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth 
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at 
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the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did 
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of 
Buildings I and 11. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract from the owner 
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, because the lien was filed for the amount 
to be reimbursed to Ellsworth Paulsen. 
26. Ellsworth Paulsen did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the 
property to exact more than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this 
Court finds no violation of U.C.A §38-1-25(1). Since the Court does not find a violation of 
Subsection (1), the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply. However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not 
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount. 
III. Wrongful Lien 
27. As to the wrongful lien claim, the evidence establishes that Mr. Ellsworth filed the 
Notice of Interest because Mr. Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth 
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea. The Notice remained a matter of 
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28, 
2002, immediately following Mr. Ellsworth's consultation with counsel. The Court finds that 
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr. Hatch, and was 
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
28. In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful lien against 
Ellsworth Paulsen, 51-SPR must qualify under U.C.A. §38-9-1, as either the record interest 
holder or record owner of the property in question. According to U.C.A. §38-9-1(6): 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute: 
11 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). 
29. The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded interest by 51-SPR during 
the time in question. Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate 
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated 
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership 
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question. The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real 
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51-SPR's interest in the North 
Shore project. 
30. The record owner at the time of recording of the wrongful lien was 
Hatch/Broadstone. 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed. 
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in Apnl 2, 2001. The release was filed on 
February 28, 2002. There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was 
the record owner as defined by U.C.A. §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor 
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful lien had any negative impact on 51-
SPR's subsequent ownership of the property. 
31. Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing 
a wrongful lien. The language of the statute provides that: 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichevei is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
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(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). 
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by 
Ellsworth Paulsen. 
32. Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to remove the Notice 
and, under the applicable statute, Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the record owner at the 
time of the recording of the document. 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a 
letter from Mr. Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See 
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002. 
33. There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr. Chimento's letter 
to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property. The only 
evidence of ownership to the real property presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of 
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and 11 establishing Broadstone as the owner without 
any reference to 51-SPR. 
34. The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no 
actual damages were proved. Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in 
connection with the removal of the wrongful lien. This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is 
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000. Any claim for attorney's fees under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is 
denied. 
IV. Retention and Retention Interest 
35. As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen 
establishes that the claimed retentions for Building 1 were in the amount of $92,939.39. The 
claimed retentions for Building 11 were in the amount of $47,142.77. 
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36. The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to subnut 
requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on 
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank. Ellsworth 
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by 
Central Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never 
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone. The 
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist. 
37. As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a 
finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR. The 
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as 
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR. 
38. Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is 
denied. U.C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51-
SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A. §13-8-5(l)(b) 
states: 
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who 
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of 
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest 
otherwise due. 
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did 
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible 
for the payment of such monies. 
V. Pre-judgement Interest 
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39. With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR. It is 
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on 
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three applications remain 
unsigned. It is not possible for the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three un-
submitted applications became due. The court has considered the information submitted by the 
parties subsequent to the time of trial with respect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the 
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to 
accrue. 
40. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling 
evidence or law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date 
as to the time for calculation of that interest. Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial, 
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated. Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its 
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications. 
41. However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment 
contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's 
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim. 
VI. Attorney's Fees 
42. Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. U.C.A §38-1-18(1) 
explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party: 
(1) Except as provided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added). 
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43. By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as 
to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees. Under 
Pochynok v. Smedsrud, et. al., 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the 
trial court was in a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party. 
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochynok, the Court finds from all the 
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth 
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows: 
A. Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted. 
B. The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on 
North Shore Buildings 1 and II at the direction of the owner, Mr. Hatch 
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change 
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the 
work requested by the owner. 
C. Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint 
venture with Broadstone and Mr. Hatch, stood in the same position as 
Broadstone. 
D. The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the 
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's lien claim and has evaluated 
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to 
its claim on the mechanic's lien claim for amounts less the $78,000 
associated with the Williams property. 
44. Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed 
amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the 
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prevailing party. Furthermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochynok 
case; in Pochynok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied 
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. Here, there 
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone. 
VL Reasonableness of Attorney Fees 
45. After the Court determined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing party, and as 
such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees, Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an 
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case. As required 
by the case of A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 
(Utah App. 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are 
recoverable under the lien statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and 
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee award. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993.60 for fees which are related directly 
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim. The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors 
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Brakes 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). These factors are: 1) 
Was the legal work actually performed ? 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute and defend the matter? 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the 
locality and type of services rendered? 4) Are there other factors requiring special 
consideration? 
46. As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed. The fees requested are not disproportionate 
to the amounts claimed or recovered. This is particularly so considering the amounts which were 
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated 
from the case through settlement. The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and 
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recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in 
open court. In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work 
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This includes the entries for such 
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal work 
related to the alternate security, and like matters. The court finds also that the amounts claimed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen as allocated to the claims for which it can recover is reasonable in the 
amount of $164,993.60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed. 
47. As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute 
the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor. This action was 
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved. The record shows 
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed. 51-
SPR asserted numerous counter-claims, which could have defeated recovery under the lien, but 
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions. 51-SPR has filed an 
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this 
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249. As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth 
Paulsen's contention that $164,993.60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the 
circumstances. 
48. The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Poulsen and Mr. Reich, 
the attorney fees for Ellswori, Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by 
attorney's of their experience. Mr. Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case 
was $170 per hour, and Mr. Reich's rate was $140 per hour. These rates are customary and usual 
for this type of legal work in Utah and Salt Lake Counties. 
49. Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case, the 
court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the 
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prevailing party in this case. Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract 
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was 
properly and timely performed and contained no defects. Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint 
venture partner, the work should have been paid for by 51-SPR. 
VII. COSTS. 
50. Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted a verified memorandum of costs in which it seeks 
reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7,467.73. The claimed costs consist of expenses 
for filing the action, services of process, witness fees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited 
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits. The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only 
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial. Ellsworth 
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial. Those persons were 
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were 
$477.60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs 
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828.13. 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract 
claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830.53 on Northshore 
Building I. Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991.26 on Northshore 
Building II, minus $78,000 for the change ordei representing amounts paid for work on the 
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest. This leaves a net judgment of 
$483,821.79 ($364,991.26 + $199,830.53 - $564,821.79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 -Net 
Judgment $483,821.79). 
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2. Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863.94 in 
accordance with the attached Schedule "A. This interest rate should be augmented by the 
interest which has accrued smce December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared) 
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768.47, for a total pre-judgment amount of 
$65,632.41. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this 
case. The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933.60 through 
February 17,h, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code. Ann. §38-18-1(1). 
4. Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828.13 to be taxed as costs. 
In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including 
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215.93 Based upon the 10% per annum 
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest post-
judgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection. The total judgment rendered in this case 
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol 
Indemnity Corporation is the surety. 
Dated this /<f day of AeriX^004. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Judge (jary £M Stott 
APPROVED AS TO FORM-
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik Olsen 
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SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Pav Request # 
Building 1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
Building II 
2 
3 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
Date 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
4/16/2001 
none 
12/15/2000 
1/11/2001 
5/31/2001 
5/31/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
none 
none 
Due Date 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
5/16/2001 
none 
1/14/2001 
2/10/2001 
6/30/2001 
6/30/200' 
8/16/2001 
8/1^/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/15/2001 
8/16/2001 
none 
none 
Date Paid 
4/16/2001 
5/7/2001 
6/27/2001 
7/5/2001 
7/18/2001 
7/26/2001 
7/31/2001 
8/10/2001 
12/31/2002 
10/14/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
2/2/2001 
2/21/2001 
7/31/2001 
10/15/2003 
12/31/2002 
10/15/2003 
10/15/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
Invoice Amount 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
GR 
47,429.87 
27,938.67 
8,000.00 
26,974.91 
10,343.70 
34,260.58 
3,961.18 
11,139.70 
800.80 
2,089.02 
16,133.59 
36,457.43 
87,138.17 
76,234.93 
345,284.19 
260,050.42 
7,342.50 
1,710.86 
10,601.00 
119,425.00 
32,978.00 
59,599.41 
83,146.18 
197,079.64 
78,465.15 
Days Late 
11 
32 
83 
91 
104 
112 
117 
127 
635 
922 
979 
991 
950 
0 
19 
11 
31 
837 
502 
790 
790 
846 
858 
0 
0 
interest Rate 
10.0% 
10,0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
TOTAL 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
TOTAL 
AND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS 
Interest Due 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
142.94 
244.94 
181.92 
672.53 
294.72 
1,051.28 
126.97 
387 60 
-
-
-
9,898.44 
22,679.80 
-
35,681.15 
1,797.37 
783.71 
62.36 
-
-
-
-
-
19,539 35 
-
-
22,182.79 
57,863.94 
Hansen seitlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halverson settlement 
never submitted 
Allstate settlement 
Hansen settlement 
Allstate settlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halversnn settlement 
never submitted 
never submitted 
ffc 
TabE 
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CAI-IIDII 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
CARTER WINDES, individually and 
d/b/a MID-AMERICA HYPERBARICS, INC., 
and/or MID-AMERICA HYPERBARICS, LLP, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RICHMOND HYPERBARIC MEDICINE, INC., 
an Arkansas corporation; JOHN A. RICHMOND, 
JR., and OCEAN BREEZE HYBERBARIC, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 04-CV-854-JHP-FHM 
ORDER 
E 
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Response 
thereto, and Defendants' Reply, as well as Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Defendants' Response thereto, and Plaintiffs' Reply. 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Defendant Richmond moves the Court for summary 
judgment in his favor on all causes of action remaining in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, to 
wit: breach of joint venture, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, quantum meruit, 
and unjust enrichment. Defendants Richmond Hyperbaric and Ocean Breeze join Richmond's 
motion as to the causes of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, the only claims 
asserted against them. Conversely, Plaintiff moves the Court for summary judgment on the 
following issues: 
(1) that Plaintiff Windes and Defendant Richmond were engaged in a joint venture 
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for purposes of obtaining a hyperbaric service contract with Tulsa Regional 
Medical Center (TRMC); 
(2) that Richmond owed Windes fiduciary duties as a result of this joint venture; 
(3) that Richmond wrongfully dissociated from the venture and usurped the TRMC 
contract; 
(4) that the profits Defendants reaped from the TRMC contract are held in trust for 
the joint venturers, i.e., Windes and Richmond. 
In the interests of accuracy and efficiency, the Court treats these pleadings as cross-
motions. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
BACKGROUND 
From the undisputed facts in this case, the Court finds the following: 
Around October 2002, Plaintiff Carter Windes approached Defendant John Richmond 
about pursuing a contract to provide hyperbaric services at TRMC. Together with Lori Ormsby 
of TRMC, the parties believed that this operation would be viable. Windes and Richmond 
decided to split their profits equally, with Richmond contributing consulting services based on 
his experience as a certified hyperbaric technician, and Windes taking responsibility for 
financing and negotiations. These terms were not reduced to writing. Both parties attended 
meetings with TRMC, and TRMC believed that they were working together on the project. The 
parties were working toward a final contract by February 2003. 
At some point during the contract negotiation process, Lori Ormsby of TRMC changed 
the contract drafted on behalf of Windes to show the name of the contractor to be "Ocean 
Breeze." Ocean Breeze was an entity created by Richmond and incorporated on or around 
February 23, 2003. Windes was not a part of Ocean Breeze. In late February 2003, Lori 
2 
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Ormsby of TRMC notified Windes that TRMC would not pursue the contract with him any 
longer. Some time after Ormsby told Windes that their deal was off, Richmond informed 
Windes that their relationship was also "finished." TRMC and Ocean Breeze executed a 
contract for Ocean Breeze to provide hyperbaric services to TRMC on March 7, 2003. The 
relationship between Ocean Breeze and TRMC lasted until June 1, 2005. 
Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant usurped the contract opportunity with TRMC and is 
liable to Plaintiff therefor. The case is now before the Court on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is significantly probative or more 
than merely colorable such that a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if proof thereof 
might affect the outcome of the lawsuit as assessed from the controlling substantive law. Id. at 
249. The presence of a genuine issue of material fact defeats the motion. 
In making the summary judgment determination, the Court examines the factual record 
and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court also interprets the rule in 
such a way as to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses. See Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is also appropriate if any 
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element of the prima facie case lacks sufficient evidence to require submission to a jury. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 
The cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Carter Windes and Defendant 
John A. Richmond are now before the Court. 
L Windes and Richmond were engaged in a joint venture. 
A joint venture is an association of two or more people to carry out a single business 
enterprise for profit. Martin v. Chapel Wilkinson. Riggs & Abney. 637 P.2d 81, 85 (Okla. 
1981). A joint venture is characterized by (1) joint interest in the project, (2) an express or 
implied agreement to share profits and losses, and (3) cooperative conduct to achieve the 
common purpose. Id; see also Crest Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.. 417 F. Supp. 564, 568-
69 (W.D. Okla. 1976). Plaintiff here asserts that the parties were engaged in a joint venture. 
Defendant denies that a joint venture was formed on the grounds that the parties did not acquire 
a joint interest in the project, nor did they agree to share losses [Def. Resp. at 5], although 
Defendant concedes that the parties agreed to share profits and engaged in cooperative conduct 
[Def.Mtn.atl4]. 
A. Joint Interest 
A joint interest in the project is demonstrated when the parties are "engaged in an 
enterprise in which they have a community of interest and a common purpose in its 
performance." Crest Constr. Co., 417 F. Supp. at 569. In order to demonstrate a joint interest, 
the parties must combine "their property, capital, materials, money, efforts, skill, services, or 
knowledge in the undertaking." 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventures § 12 (cmt.). The parties' 
contributions need not be equal in character or proportion "so long as each joint venturer 
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contributes something to the motive of the enterprise." Id; see also Martin, 637 P.2d at 85 (each 
party must contribute "something promotive of the enterprise"). 
Here, the undisputed facts show that Windes and Richmond orally agreed to pursue a 
contract to provide hyperbaric services to Tulsa Regional Medical Center (TRMC). [Def. Mtn. at 
4, U 15; Pltf. Mtn. at 3, ffi[ 1-4.] They each assumed duties toward the furtherance of the venture. 
Windes established initial contact with TRMC. [Def Mtn. at 4, f 12; Pltf. Mtn. at 3, % 2.] 
Windes was also supposed to secure financing [Def. Mtn. at 5, K 18; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, % 5] and 
continue negotiations with TRMC [Def. Mtn. at 5, lfl[ 18, 22; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, 5, ffl[ 6, 12]. 
Richmond was supposed to provide expertise on hyperbaric services, a crucial contribution to the 
venture, as Windes had no experience in this area. [Def. Mtn. at 4, ffi[ 14-15; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, ffi[ 5, 
8.] Both parties had contact with TRMC's contracting official [Def. Mtn. at 5, 9, 10, fflj 20, 43, 
45; Pltf. Mtn. at 3, 4, ffi[ 3, 9], who believed that Windes and Richmond were working together 
[Def. Mtn. at 5, \ 20; Pltf. Mtn. at 4, U 10]. Windes and Richmond undertook all of these 
activities with the agreement that they would share profits equally [Def. Mtn. at 4, ^ | 4; Pltf. Mtn. 
at 3, H 4], which further implies a joint interest in the project. See Ballard v. United States. 17 
F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1994). These actions also demonstrate the parties' cooperative conduct in 
furtherance of the purpose of the joint venture. 
B. Profit and Loss Sharing 
An agreement to share prufits and losses may be express or implied. Martin, 637 P.2d at 
85. Here, the parties expressly agreed .o split their profits equally. [Def. Mtn. at 4, U 4; Pltf. 
Mtn. at 3, ^  4.] While the parties did not have an express agreement as to losses, such agreement 
may be inferred. Because Richmond agreed to provide consulting services "solely in return for a 
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share of expected profits, it could be seen that he stood to share in the losses of the enterprise as 
well as its profits." See Crest Constr. Co., 417 F. Supp. at 468; compare Def Mtn. at 10, ^  49 
(stating that "Richmond was to receive 50% of the profits and was to have no personal financial 
liability whatsoever for the purchase of the chambers) (emphasis added), with Pltf. Mtn. at 4, ^ 
7 (noting that "Richmond's compensation was based on profits" and if the project was not 
profitable, "he would lose his time, travel, and efforts he put into the venture"). 
Based on its review of the undisputed facts in this case, as well as the applicable law, this 
Court finds that Windes and Richmond did establish a joint venture for the particular purpose of 
obtaining a hyperbaric service contract with TRMC. Proposition One of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. For the same reasons, Argument One of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is primarily predicated upon the proposition 
that no joint venture existed between these parties, is DENIED. Because the Court finds that the 
agreement between these parties is properly characterized as a joint venture, the Court agrees 
with Defendant that Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is "simply a weaker version of the first 
cause of action for breach of joint venture agreement." [Def. Mtn. at 20.] The oral contract 
alleged by Plaintiff that supposedly obligated Richmond to pay Windes a percentage of the profit 
[see Am. Compl. U 47] is actually part of the oral joint venture agreement between the parties, 
rather than a separate contract. The Court therefore GRANTS Argument Three of Defendant's 
Motion for Nummary Judgment, and thereby disposes of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim. 
II. The relationship between joint venturers is fiduciary in nature. 
It is axiomatic that the relationship between joint venturers is fiduciary in nature and 
requires the utmost good faith in all dealings of the parties with each other. Rockett v. Ford, 326 
6 
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P.2d 787, 791 (Okla. 1958); Dike v. Martin. 204 P. 1106, 1109 (Okla. 1922). As a matter of law, 
"a joint adventurer . . . owes a fiduciary duty to the other partners not to open a competing 
[enterprise] and not to divert assets of the joint venture to that competing [enterprise]." Hallock 
v. Holiday Isle Resort & Marina. 885 So. 2d 459, 462 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). This duty not to 
compete, as well as other fiduciary duties, derives from state partnership law. Crest Constr. Co.. 
417 F. Supp. at 568. Indeed, the law of partnership applies equally to joint ventures. See The 
Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil. 440 P.2d 978, 984 (Okla. 1968)(citing O.K. Boiler & Welding Co. v. 
Minnetonka Lumber Co.. 229 P. 1045, 1048 (Okla. 1924)("After the parties have created and 
engaged in a joint enterprise, although it may relate to a single transaction, the law of partnership 
applies to the questions arising between and among the parties, and in relation to third 
parties.")). In Oklahoma, under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 54 Okla. Stat. § 1-101 et 
seq., joint venturers owe each other the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Id § 1-404(a). 
Joint venturers' duty of loyalty to each other specifically includes "to refrain from competing 
with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before the dissolution of the 
partnership," among other duties. Id § 1-404(b)(3). Further, a joint venturer must "account to 
the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit. . . derived from . . . the 
appropriation of a partnership opportunity." Id § 1-404(b)(1). These obligations are directly at 
issue in this case. 
Because the Court finds that Windes and Richmond were engaged in a joint venture, the 
Court also finds as a matter of law that these parties owed a fiduciary duty to each other. 
Proposition Two of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. 
7 
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III. Richmond breached his duty of loyalty to Windes. 
A party to a joint venture may always withdraw by giving notice to his partners. 54 
Okla. Stat. § 1-601(1). Here, Defendant did give notice of his express will to withdraw. [Def. 
Mtn. at 17.] However, Plaintiff asserts that Richmond's withdrawal was untimely and otherwise 
inappropriate so as to constitute a breach of the joint venture agreement. [Pltf. Mtn. at 13.] 
Further, Plaintiff argues that even if Richmond properly terminated the venture, Richmond was 
still not entitled to pursue the venture project independently, due to his ongoing duty not to 
compete. [Pltf. Mtn. at 14-15.] 
In response to Plaintiffs claims of breach, Defendant alleges that the venture had already 
failed. [Def. Mtn. at 14-16.] In certain cases, a joint venture may fail because conditions 
necessary to its success cannot be met. See Knight v. Cecil 235 P. 1107, 1111 (Okla. 1925). In 
such instances, 
[i]f any party to the joint venture had refused to substantially perform his 
obligation, his associates might terminate their relation with him and carry out the 
enterprise to his exclusion, and if for this or any other valid reason they chose to 
terminate the relationship, they could do so only by giving notice to him that the 
relationship was then and there ended. 
Id. at 1112. Under the analogous Oklahoma partnership law, a party to a joint venture may seek 
termination of the venture via judicial determination if his partner "engaged in conduct relating 
to the partnership business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in 
partnership with the partner " 54 Okla. Stat. § l-601(5)(iii). 
Here, Defendant alleges that Windes "dropped the ball" so that TRMC refused to do 
business with Windes, and the venture itself therefore became "impracticable." [Def. Mtn. at 14-
16.] In the alternative, Richmond asserts that he properly withdrew from the venture and 
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pursued the TRMC contract independently because Windes failed to perform. [Def Mtn. at 17.] 
However, because Defendant did not seek Windes's expulsion by judicial termination, the joint 
venture was not successfully terminated and Richmond's withdrawal was therefore wrongful. 
Although the Court recognizes the parties' belief that an ongoing "source of contention 
lies in the extent and nature of the fiduciary duty owed " between them, see Hallock, 885 So. 2d 
at 464 (Shepherd, J., dissenting in part), the Court does not find any genuine issues of material 
fact to support said contention. "[T]he four elements of an actionable breach of fiduciary duty 
claim are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a duty arising out of the fiduciary 
relationship, (3) a breach of the duty, and (4) damages proximately caused by the breach of 
duty." FDIC v. Grant. 8 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1299 (N.D. Okla. 1999). Pursuant to the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act, 54 Okla. Stat. § 1-101 et seq., the Court finds that Richmond breached 
the duty of loyalty he owed to Windes by virtue of their joint venture. Although the timing of 
the notice Richmond gave to Windes that the joint venture was "finished," relative to other key 
events in the history of this venture, such as the timing of and circumstances surrounding the 
formation of Ocean Breeze1 is disputed, the fact of the matter is that Richmond's withdrawal 
from the venture before the completion of the undertaking was wrongful as a matter of law. See 
id. § l-602(b)(2)(I)("A partner's dissociation is wrongful only if. . . in the case of a partnership 
for a . . . particular undertaking, before . . . the completion of the undertaking^] . . . the partner 
1
 Joint ventures differ from partnerships in tha: the parties to a joint venture may engage 
in separate business enterprises - even competing ones - during the pursuit of the joint venture 
project. See generally Hallock, 885 So. 2d at 463-466 (Shepherd, J., dissenting in part). Thus, 
Richmond could have formed Ocean Breeze to pursue hyperbaric service contracts with other 
medical facilities without insult or injury to his venture with Windes, which was formed solely 
for the purpose of pursuing such a contract with TRMC. It is the fact that Ocean Breeze 
ultimately secured a contract with TRMC that raises the specters of breach and fraud in this case. 
9 
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withdraws by express will "). Proposition Three of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is therefore GRANTED, and Argument Two of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. 
In the event of wrongful dissociation, the withdrawing partner is liable for any damages 
caused by the withdrawal. Id. § 1-602(c). It is well settled that a partner's duty of loyalty 
extends well past that partner's withdrawal. See, e.g., Leff v. Gunter. 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 
1983) ("A partner's duty not to compete with his partnership with respect to the partnership 
opportunity which is actively being pursued by the partnership survives his withdrawal 
therefrom."). It is also well settled that, upon breach of that duty, the breaching partner must 
compensate the others. See kL ("A partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of 
the business himself, unless he fully compensates his copartner for his share of the prospective 
business opportunity."); see also id. at 746 ("If a member of a copartnership avails himself of 
information obtained by him in the course of the transaction of partnership business which is 
within the scope of the firm's business, and thereafter applies it to his own account without the 
consent or knowledge of his associates, he is liable to account to the firm for any benefit he may 
obtain from the use of such information."). Here, although Defendant is clearly liable, the 
amount of any damages owed is still in dispute. Proposition Four of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED because the profits derived from Richmond's 
usurpation of the joint venture's opportunity are unquantified. 
IV. Plaintiffs fraud claims are still unresolved. 
Whether Plaintiff believes Defendant's breach to be premised on fraud is unclear. 
Plaintiff asserts a fraud claim against Defendant, predicated on the idea that Richmond was 
10 
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supposed to "stay behind the scenes." [Am. Compl. 1fl] 35-42; see also Def. Mtn. at 21.] In order 
to prove fraud on this point, Windes must establish that (1) Richmond's promise to "stay behind 
the scenes" was a material misrepresentation, (2) it was false, (3) Richmond knew it was false, 
(4) Richmond intended Windes to rely on the misrepresentation, (4) Windes acted in reliance 
thereon, and (5) Windes suffered injury. OUJI-Civ § 18.1; see also Ragland v. Shattuck Nat'I 
Bank. 36 F.3d 983, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (U[A] fraud claim requires proof of these elements: a 
material misrepresentation, knowingly or recklessly made, with intent that it be relied upon, and 
actual reliance by another to his detriment, and that plaintiffs had stated a claim of fraud . . . with 
sufficient particularity to avoid dismissal of their claims."). 
Plaintiff also argues that Richmond committed a fraud of omission by failing to notify 
Windes of TRMCs dissatisfaction with the progress of the joint venture and instead making 
arrangements to take over the project. [Am. Compl. ffl[ 35-42; see also Pltf. Resp. at 23-24.] To 
prove fraud by non-disclosure, Windes must show that (1) Richmond failed to disclose a past or 
present fact which he had a duty to disclose, (2) the fact was material, (3) Richmond failed to 
disclose the fact in order to create a false impression in Windes's mind, (4) Richmond intended 
Windes to act upon the false impression caused by the non-disclosure, (5) Windes acted in 
reliance thereon, and (6) Windes suffered injury. OUJI-Civ § 18.2. "Under Oklahoma law, in 
determining whether there is a duty to speak, consideration must be given to the situation of the 
parties and matters with which they are dealing." Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 
1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys.. Inc. v. Brown Flight Rental One Corp.. 
24 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 1994)). For example, an "absolute positive duty to speak" may 
arise from a fiduciary duty or from a partial disclosure. LI 
11 
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Defendant moves for summary judgment of Plaintiff s fraud claims on the grounds that 
Windes did not change his behavior or rely to his detriment on the alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The Court finds this argument to be more artful than 
dispositive. From the facts on hand, a jury could find reliance. Moreover, if fraud does lie in 
this case, Plaintiff could be entitled to punitive damages, which would necessitate additional 
findings beyond the scope of the motions at issue here. See Roberts Ranch Co. v. Exxon Corp., 
43 F. Supp. 2d 1242,1276 (W.D. Okla. 1997) ("Under Oklahoma law punitive damages are 
available for a breach of fiduciary duty where the gravamen of the claim sounds in tort."). 
Argument Four of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED. 
V. Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable remedies. 
Plaintiff asserted claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment against all 
Defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment of Plaintiff s equitable claims on the 
grounds that Windes did not contribute to the joint venture and thus, does not deserve 
compensation in quantum meruit, and that any profits realized by Richmond and/or Ocean 
Breeze are attributable solely to their own efforts. The Court finds that the issue of Windes's 
contribution to the joint venture may be subject to different interpretations under the facts 
presented such that summary judgment is inappropriate on that point. 
However, the Court notes that neither party addressed the issue of equitable jurisdiction, 
which requires that legal remedies be insufficient to redress the plaintiffs injuries before a 
plaintiff is entitled to recover in equity. See, e.g., Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 991 (10th Cir. 
2001) (noting that equitable relief is generally only available in the absence of adequate remedies 
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at law). The Court finds that legal remedies would be appropriate in this case, particularly given 
the characterization of the relationship between the parties as a joint venture, for which the 
analogous laws of partnership provide a specific remedy. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to 
equitable remedies, and Argument Five of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
accordingly GRANTED. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
in part and DENIED in part. Because the Court's disposition of certain matters on summary 
judgment limits the remaining issues rather significantly, the parties are instructed to file a 
Second Supplemental Proposed Pretrial Order by January 17, 2006, with a Pretrial Conference to 
follow on January 24, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. This case has been set for trial on February 21, 2006. 
The parties shall advise the Court within 10 days from the date of this Order whether they desire 
a second Settlement Conference before that time. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of December 2005. 
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